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Abstract
This thesis consists of an introduction to a topic of optimal use
of taxes and government expenditure and three chapters analysing
these themes more in depth. Chapter 2 analyses to what extent a
given amount of subsidies aﬀects the labour supply of parents. Mu-
nicipal supplement to the Finnish home care allowance provides ex-
ogenous variation to labour supply decision of a parent. This kind of
subsidy that is tied to staying at home instead of working is found to
have fairly large eﬀect on labour supply decisions of parents. Chapter
3 studies theoretically when it is optimal to provide publicly private
goods. In the set up of the model government sets income taxes op-
timally and provides a private good, if it is beneﬁcial to do so. The
analysis results in an optimal provision rule according to which the
good should be provided when it lowers the participation threshold
into labour force. Chapter 4 investigates what happened to prices
and demand when hairdressers’ value added tax was cut in Finland
from 22 per cent to 8 per cent. The pass-through to prices was about
half of the full pass-through and no clear indication of increased de-
mand for the services or better employment situation in the sector
is found.
Key words: Public economics, optimal taxes, government expen-
diture, labour supply, VAT
Tiivistelma¨: Ta¨ma¨ va¨ito¨skirja koostuu julkistaloustieteen alan
verotusta ja valtioiden varojen ka¨ytto¨a¨ esitteleva¨sta¨ johdantoluvusta
ja kolmesta luvusta, jotka analysoivat ta¨ma¨n aihealueen osateemoja
tarkemmin. Luku 2 tutkii kuinka paljon vanhemmille annettu tuki
vaikuttaa heida¨n tyo¨n tarjontapa¨a¨to¨ksiinsa¨. Kotihoidontuen kun-
talisa¨ tarjoaa vanhempien tyo¨n tarjontapa¨a¨to¨ksista¨ riippumatonta
vaihtelua tukien suuruuksissa. Ta¨ma¨n tyyppisen tuen, joka on si-
dottu kotona olemiseen tyo¨nteon asemasta, havaitaan vaikuttavan
suhteellisen paljon vanhempien tyo¨n tarjontaan. Luvussa 3 tarkastel-
laan teoreettisen mallin avulla milloin julkisen vallan on optimaal-
ista tarjota yksityishyo¨dykkeita¨. Mallissa valtio asettaa tuloverot
optimaalisesti ja tarjoaa yksityishyo¨dyketta¨, jos sen havaitaan olevan
iii
optimaalista. Luvun analyysi tuottaa julkiselle vallalle tarjontasa¨a¨n-
no¨n, jonka mukaan yksityishyo¨dykkeen tarjoaminen on optimaalis-
ta, jos sen tarjoaminen alentaa tyo¨voimaan osallistumisen kynnysta¨.
Luku 4 tutkii mita¨ hinnoille ja palveluiden kysynna¨lle tapahtui, kun
parturi-kampaamojen arvonlisa¨veroa alennettiin Suomessa 22 pro-
sentista 8 prosenttiin. Veron alennus meni hintoihin la¨pi puolel-
la ta¨yden la¨pimenon ma¨a¨ra¨sta¨. Merkitta¨va¨a¨ kysynta¨vaikutusta tai
tyo¨llisyyden lisa¨ysta¨ alalle ei tutkimuksessa lo¨ytynyt.
Avainsanat: Julkistaloustiede, optimaaliset verot, julkinen tar-
jonta, tyo¨n tarjonta, ALV
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
How to collect tax revenue and how a government should spend that revenue
is one of the age-old questions in economics. The question has not lost its
importance in modern times, since the amount developed countries collect
in tax revenue has increased. The answer will depend on the economic
conditions and what we think about economic behaviour. Consequently,
the development of economic theory has aﬀected the answer economists
will give about what kind of tax system is optimal.
Early on, the debate was about how to collect enough revenue with little
distortion. There was some discussion as to whether income taxes or con-
sumption taxes were preferable. Eighteenth-century economists tended to
favour consumption taxes and in many countries income taxes were imple-
mented as late as in the 19th or 20th centuries (Salanie´ 2003). Adam Smith,
for example, considered that taxes on wages were fully shifted to wages, but
had a more elaborate analysis about the shifting of consumption taxes to
the prices of goods (Blaug 1997, Ch 2). Nowadays most research tends to
focus on income taxation. It is important to analyse both types of taxes,
not least because they are widely used as sources of government income in
developed countries.
However, the more fundamental question relates to the existence of tax-
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ation in the ﬁrst place. In public ﬁnance it is thought that the main role of
taxation is to redistribute income and guarantee certain basic functions of
the state (at a minimum). The former is usually achieved through income
taxes and subsidies, including all sorts of income transfers from the gov-
ernment to individuals. The latter includes a wide range of activities from
national defence to the public provision of day care for children. While in
general these topics have attracted much research in the past, recent devel-
opments in this ﬁeld reveal that there is still much to learn. Even if it is
agreed that there should be some taxation, there is uncertainty regarding
the optimal design of a tax structure. To what extent should the govern-
ment support those not in the labour force relative to the taxes it imposes
on those in it? Should taxes on diﬀerent commodities be uniform or should
they diﬀer from each other? These are questions where further research will
be needed.
1.1.1 Research Traditions
Eﬃciency
Eﬃciency was the main concern in early 20th-century economics. Standard
economic theory claims that the consumption of goods depends on supply
and demand factors. These form a static equilibrium, which is deﬁned by
prices and quantities. In this standard model, the ﬁrst and second wel-
fare theorems state that market outcomes lead to eﬃcient allocations. An
equilibrium is eﬃcient if no reallocation is Pareto improving. When imple-
menting economic policy, the more eﬃcient the policy is the less losses it
creates.
The models used in public ﬁnance take into account the speciﬁc way in
which taxes can be distorting. In conditions that lead to eﬃciency in market
allocations, lump-sum taxes can be used to redistribute income without
inducing ineﬃciency. At a given government revenue requirement, revenue
can be collected eﬃciently using lump-sum taxes. These are uniform if
it is also assumed that individuals are homogeneous. With heterogeneous
individuals, lump-sum taxes diﬀer across individuals, but are undistorting
2
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if they do not depend on decisions taken by individuals rather than their
type.
Empirically, states collect revenue via other forms of taxes which are
distorting. Then the aim of tax theory is to provide results that minimise the
ineﬃciency caused by distorting taxation. The seminal article by Ramsey
(1927) analysed this kind of problem. In his article there are n consumption
goods that are taxed linearly. The simpliﬁed version of this result where
the optimal tax of a good depends inversely on its own demand elasticity
is particularly well known. The general version of the Ramsey result is
more complicated than that. The result could be interpreted in such a way
that the eﬀect of a tax on changes in the equilibrium quantity of each good
should be uniform. Alternatively, the distortions imposed by taxation on
each good should be equal. The eﬃciency loss induced by taxation depends
on the eﬀect of the quantity of each good. Thus the Ramsey model is a
general equilibrium model that accounts for eﬃciency eﬀects resulting from
linear commodity taxation.
Equity and Eﬃciency, the Mirrlees Model
In 1970s the assumption of informational asymmetry was incorporated into
the analysis of tax systems. In this second-best world taxes can be dis-
torting because of the ineﬃciencies created by the information asymmetry.
This creates a speciﬁc reason why lump-sum taxes are not possible tax in-
struments to the government. For this reason consumption taxes can not
be set diﬀerently depending on amount consumed to each household, since
it is not known how much each household consumes. Instead consumption
taxes need to depend on the value of the good consumed. Moreover income
taxes can not be levied as a lump sum since it is not known how much each
individual would produce in the absence of taxation. Levying too much tax
on individuals would induce ineﬃciency since the labour supply decision
would be distorted downwards. If a state wants to redistribute income - an
equity problem - it needs to take into account to what extent the taxes it
collects distort - an eﬃciency problem.
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Mirrlees (1971) formulated a theory of optimal income taxes which takes
into account both equity and eﬃciency considerations. The main aspects
of the model are a government that aims to maximise a welfare functional,
information asymmetry and heterogeneity regarding the ability of individ-
uals to supply labour. Equity considerations are addressed in this model
through the government’s objective of redistributing income. The extent
of this desire can be adjusted by selecting diﬀerent welfare functionals that
weight the utilities of individuals across the income distribution according
to the redistribution objective. The eﬃciency enters the model through the
information asymmetry allowing the labour supply to diminish if taxes are
set too high. Individuals know their ability type, but governments only ob-
serve total labour income, i.e. productivity multiplied by the working hours
or intensity of an individual. If individuals are not given proper incentives,
they will alter their labour supply behaviour.
In solving this problem, one is able to balance the equity and eﬃciency
requirements with an optimal income tax schedule. The solution formulated
by Mirrlees (1971) is not completely informative about the shape of the
income tax schedule. The general results inform us that the optimal tax
schedule is not linear, it can be progressive and marginal tax rates are not
negative. There is also a zero result for individuals in the bottom and top
points of income distribution if there is no bunching, but these results are
very local in terms of the whole distribution.
Technically the Mirrlees model is formulated as an optimal control prob-
lem. The incomes and utilities of individuals are optimised over a continuum
of ability types, rather than time. The incentive compatibility constraint
that allows individuals to choose according to their type forms the equa-
tion of motion. The government revenue constraint is incorporated into the
objective functional.
Mirrlees’s (1971) article was followed by a large amount of literature.
Recently, Saez (2001) derived results from assumptions similar to those of
Mirrlees (1971), but producing much more practical rules utilising the elas-
ticities and shape of an empirical income distribution rather than a theoret-
ical ability distribution. This makes it easier to obtain the shape of optimal
4
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income tax schedule in empirical simulations. There is a parameter describ-
ing the redistributive tastes of the government and labour supply elasticity
parameters for each part of the income distribution so as to capture the
ineﬃciency eﬀects of taxation.
One of the simplifying assumptions in the Mirrlees model is that the in-
dividual’s decision is simply to choose the amount of working hours or work
intensity; there is only an intensive labour supply elasticity. In this inten-
sive elasticity it is assumed that individuals respond to marginal changes
in taxes solely through marginal adjustments in the amount or intensity of
labour supplied. Saez (2002) considered a more complicated problem where
there is an extensive labour supply elasticity in addition to an intensive
labour supply elasticity. Then changes in taxes can induce some individu-
als to drop out of the labour force, even if they are not at the bottom of
the income distribution. In this model it can be optimal to have negative
marginal tax rates, thus making in-work subsidies optimal. This feature is
ampliﬁed in proportion to the degree of the extensive labour supply elas-
ticity. In the second essay of this thesis (chapter III), I analyse public
provision of goods in an optimal income tax model that incorporates both
the extensive and intensive labour supply margins.
Consumption taxes
Taking information asymmetry and the equity considerations into account
will aﬀect which kind of consumption taxes are desirable. The Ramsey
(1927) model is valid when using linear income taxes and taking eﬃciency
into account. However, the Ramsey model is a representative household
model, making it impossible to take equity considerations into account.
Later literature has adjusted the optimal consumption tax analysis to more
realistic situations. For example, Myles (1989) formulated the Ramsey re-
sult with imperfect competition.
What about the choice between income taxes and consumption taxes?
In a static framework, linear income tax and uniform consumption taxes
yield equivalent outcomes in terms of collecting revenue. Corlett and Hague
5
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(1953) investigated the relationship between consumption taxes and labour
taxes in an economy where there are at least two consumption goods and
individuals also supply labour. Proportional income taxation is assumed.
Their main ﬁnding is that goods that are complementary to leisure should
be taxed more than goods that are substitutes for leisure. One drawback of
this model is that the supply side is assumed to be perfectly elastic so that
the equilibrium quantities of goods are aﬀected only through demand-side
eﬀects. Then it is not possible to obtain the Ramsey eﬀect that taxing one
good diﬀerently from others also aﬀects the equilibrium quantities of other
goods (possibly through changes in production). Another missing element
in the Corlett and Hague (1953) model is a more realistic treatment of
income taxation.
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) address the missing equity aspect in the
Ramsey model by generalizing it to a population of heterogeneous house-
holds. The problem of the Ramsey model is that the result tends to put
higher taxes on necessities such as food and lower taxes on luxuries. This
has been seen to be a socially unjust rule, and stems from considering eﬃ-
ciency alone. The Diamond and Mirrlees model (1971) takes both aspects,
eﬃciency and equity, into account. The resulting rule has an element that
suppresses taxes on the kind of goods that are consumed by socially valued
individuals who have a high marginal value for money. There is also an
element relating to eﬃciency, similar to that in the Ramsey model, that
emphasises the eﬀect of taxes on the quantity of a good in equilibrium.
Thus their result balances between these two eﬀects.
Considerable attention is also given to conditions where uniform com-
modity taxation is optimal (Diamond and Mirrlees 1971 and Atkinson and
Stiglitz 1976). If the consumption of goods and leisure is weakly separable
in individual utility functions, consumption taxes should be uniform across
commodities. All the necessary redistribution can be dealt with through
optimal income taxes, and diﬀerentiating consumption tax rates does not
increase eﬃciency.
Another set of results considering commodity taxes has addressed the
question, whether income should be redistributed through income taxes or
6
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consumption taxes. The question is similar to that addressed by Corlett
and Hague (1953), but now there is income to be redistributed across a
heterogeneous population. If optimally set income taxation takes care of
redistribution, then consumption taxes could be uniform. Mirrlees (1976)
sets up a model where heterogeneous individuals supply labour and consume
goods. Income taxes are set optimally together with consumption taxes.
Optimal consumption taxes are not uniform if they reveal information about
the ability or productivity of an individual. A similar result was obtained by
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976). These models assume that there are constant
returns to scale and the supply side is perfectly elastic. Thus Ramsey-type
eﬃciency considerations are not properly taken into account. Naito (1999)
has investigated the general equilibrium model with two types of workers.
Public goods
Part of the tax revenue collected is used in government expenditure to pro-
vide public goods. Public goods satisfy non-excludability and non-rivalry
properties. No-one can be excluded from consuming them once they are
provided. Examples of public goods are infrastructure, national defense
and pure air. Therefore a public good enters all utility functions in an
economy. For this reason there is market failure. Since everyone can con-
sume them, the market prices are not informative of the extent to which
they are produced. Instead it is eﬃcient to provide such goods collectively
(Myles 1995, Ch 9).
If market prices do not provide information how much of a public good
should be provided, how do we know what is the optimal amount? Samuel-
son (1954) developed a simple rule that equates the marginal substitutions
of private and public goods to the marginal rate of transformation to pro-
duce the public good. The interpretation of this rule is that the good should
be provided as long as individuals on aggregate enjoy the marginal increase
in their consumption of the public good. This is equated with the marginal
costs of producing the good.
Few goods are actually pure public goods. In many instances individuals
7
Chapter 1. Introduction
could be prevented from consuming the good in question with ﬁnite costs.
For this reason, the analysis has been extended to the case of publicly
provided private goods (Blackorby and Donaldson 1988 and Besley and
Coate 1991). Examples of these kinds of goods are education, health care
and child care. Standard economic reasoning states that it is better to give
monetary transfers than goods. Then the recipient can decide how to spend
the extra income in a way that is optimal for him or her. However, it is
optimal to provide a private good publicly because this helps to alleviate
the information problem. If everyone is given the amount needed for health
care it is more expensive than to provide the health care because everyone
would accept the money but only those who need the health care would
consume it. This reasoning works if it is not known who needs health care.
The state collects the taxes and provides the public good. Thus optimal
taxes and public goods should be considered in the same analysis. There
is literature considering the provision of a public good together with op-
timal income taxes (Mirrlees 1976, Christiansen 1981). The ﬁndings are
that public provision should follow the Samuelson rule if consumption of a
public good does not alleviate the information problem of the government.
If the public good is separable from leisure in an individual utility function,
the consumption of public good does not reveal information about the in-
dividual’s ability type and thus provision of public good should follow the
Samuelson rule. On the contrary in a situation where consumption of public
good and leisure are not separable, it is optimal to provide a public good
that is a substitute for leisure more than the Samuelson rule implies. Gov-
ernment provision improves eﬃciency, since taxes need not be as distorting
as they would be without provision of the public good. In the second essay
of this thesis I study the public provision of a private good when the gov-
ernment sets income taxes optimally. There is also an extensive margin of
labour supply in the model and the public provision of the good can aﬀect
this margin.
A prime example of this kind of good is children’s day care. Public
provision of day care may be optimal because the good is related to the
employment decisions made by parents. When day care is complementary
8
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to the labour supply, it should be provided to a greater extent than the
Samuelson rule implies. In the ﬁrst essay of this thesis (in chapter II), I
analyse how child care related subsidies aﬀect the labour supply decisions
of parents.
1.2 Summary of the essays
Here I give a short summary and the main results of the essays in the thesis.
1.2.1 The eﬀect of child care subsidies on the labour
supply of parents
For any modern state it is essential that most of the population supplies
labour. There are instances where it is not possible for working-age indi-
viduals to do so. In developed countries the public sector provides them
ﬁnancial support. While it is agreed that this kind of social security is
needed, there is also a worry that too much of it discourages working. For
empirical research the challenge is to measure to what degree ﬁnancial sup-
port discourages working. In the ﬁrst essay (Chapter II) of this thesis, I
study the labour supply decisions of parents who are given ﬁnancial support
if they stay at home taking care of their children. The question this article
answers is, how large is the participation elasticity for a sub-population of
mothers.
In the Finnish day care system a relatively generous home-care allowance
is given to parents who stay at home to take care of their children. It consists
of a national allowance and a supplement in some municipalities. This
subsidy clearly increases incentives to stay outside of the labour force for
prolonged periods. Changes in the municipal supplement provide exogenous
variation in the labour supply of mothers. The variation is exogenous to
the labour supply since being eligible for a supplement does not depend on
one’s current labour supply decision or income prior to maternity leave. A
mother is eligible for a supplement based on the municipality she lives in
and the age of her youngest child.
9
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Using this feature of the Finnish day care system, I am able to study the
parameters used in optimal income tax models. In Saez (2002) the partici-
pation decision depends on the diﬀerence in after-tax incomes corresponding
to two diﬀerent employment status, working and not working. With vari-
ation in the home-care allowance, I also have variation in this diﬀerence.
It corresponds to the after-tax income when one is not working. Thus, the
home-care allowance can be used to estimate the participation elasticity of
individuals who are at diﬀerent points along the income distribution when
employed.
The main results show a supplement leads to signiﬁcant negative labour
supply and earned income eﬀects. The estimated eﬀect indicates that 4
per cent fewer mothers participate when a supplement is increased by 100
euros per month. Surprisingly, I ﬁnd a larger response for higher-educated
than for lower-educated mothers. To put these reduced-form estimates into
a policy context, I estimate participation elasticity using the exogenous
variation as an instrument. The results indicate a participation elasticity
of 0.9 for all mothers. These ﬁndings survive a battery of sensitivity and
robustness checks. I perform all estimates for fathers as well, but do not
ﬁnd any eﬀect on their labour supply.
In comparison to previous studies, a municipal supplement provides sev-
eral attractive features to study how changes in taxes aﬀect the labour sup-
ply. Municipalities have changed their supplements on several occasions.
This allows me to compare very similar people with each other. For ex-
ample, Eissa and Liebman (1996) compared the outcomes of mothers with
women without children and Blundell et al. (1988) compared the outcomes
of women across education levels and cohorts, although it is reasonable to
assume that these two groups behave in diﬀerent ways. The multiple re-
forms introduced at diﬀerent points of time also help to clean out macro
shocks from the treatment and control groups. This would not be the case
if the reforms were enacted simultaneously or there was only one treated
group as in Schone (2004) and Baker et al. (2008).
Many reforms used in previous studies have mostly aﬀected income of
low-income individuals when they are working (e.g. Eissa and Liebman
10
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1996 and Milligan and Stabile 2007). On the other hand, a municipal sup-
plement aﬀects the after-tax income of everyone when they are not working.
Consequently, I am able to estimate the participation elasticity for diﬀerent
income levels using education as a proxy for income. These participation
elasticities can be used in tax simulations analysing the optimality of tax
systems (Saez 2001, Saez 2002 and Immervoll et al. 2007). To improve
these policy relevant simulations, it is important to know more about the
labour supply responses of diﬀerent subgroups. In contrast to most ear-
lier results, the results show an increasing participation elasticity proﬁle in
income (Eissa and Liebman 1996).
This study also adds to the literature estimating the labour supply ef-
fects of child care policies. The policies range from lowered day care prices
(Lundin et al. 2008, Baker et al. 2008 and Lefebvre and Merrigan 2008)
to employment responses of maternity leave (Baker et al. 2008b) to child
care-related beneﬁts (Milligan and Stabile 2007)1.
1.2.2 Public provision of private goods with optimal
income taxation and extensive margin
Public sector services vary across countries. Health care, day care for chil-
dren, care for the elderly and education are mostly publicly provided in
Nordic countries, while in Anglo-Saxon countries the system relies more
on private markets. The second essay of this thesis studies the optimality
of public provision of a private good when the good can aﬀect the exten-
sive margin of labour supply. The model includes income taxation that is
set optimally by the government. Therefore, the model analysed here is
connected to the Mirrlees (1971) tradition.
In the original Mirrlees (1971) model there is only an intensive labour
supply margin. This assumption does not ﬁt with the actual working hours
1Milligan and Stabile (2007) studied the National Child Beneﬁt reform in Canada.
With province-level reforms, the variation that they observed does not arise from a single
treated group, a problem in many of the articles cited above. Their results indicate an
elasticity of 0.96 from having earnings as a major source of income, which is comparable
to what I ﬁnd.
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distribution, where there is bunching at zero hours and strictly positive
working hours, but nothing between. Recent optimal income tax literature
has addressed this issue (Saez 2002, Immervoll et al. 2007 and Eissa et al.
2008). Taking the participation decision into account makes it optimal to
have negative marginal tax rates. It can be optimal to radically reduce the
tax burden of the working poor and at the same time reduce unemployment
beneﬁts. Also, empirical studies ﬁnd the extensive elasticity to be larger
than the intensive elasticity (Eissa and Hoynes 2004, Blundell 2006). This
tends to amplify the signiﬁcance of taking the extensive margin into account
in optimal income tax models.
The second essay studies the optimality of public provision whilst taking
the participation decision into account. To model that, there is a ﬁxed cost
arising from participation. This assumption has been used in earlier papers
(Cogan 1981, Immervoll et al. 2007 and Eissa et al. 2008). The intuition is
that to participate, one needs to suﬀer or pay a ﬁxed cost. The ﬁxed cost
can be any cost or burden that is a one-time event and arises only when
participating. This could be, for example, children’s day care, the time cost
involved in travelling to work or, at a more general level, the cost of ﬁnding
a job.
As in Saez (2002), here the government can aﬀect the utility diﬀerence
between working and not through income taxes. At the same time, the gov-
ernment can aﬀect the distribution of ﬁxed costs through public provision.
If the good is children’s day care, public provision of it lowers the ﬁxed cost
relative to a situation where people buy day care on the private market
at a higher price. Thus, provision of day care in this case is beneﬁcial,
since it allows more people to participate. Other things being equal, the
government receives higher tax revenue.
It is assumed that the ﬁxed cost is private information and individuals
are heterogeneous in terms of the extent of it. Thus, the ﬁxed cost is very
much like the ability type in the traditional Mirrlees (1971) model. The
diﬀerence here is that there is a threshold for the ﬁxed cost. If an individual
has a ﬁxed cost higher than the threshold value, he or she decides not to
participate.
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From this setting the optimal tax rates and optimal public provision
rules are derived. The results imply that in this second-best world it is
optimal for the government to use both taxes and public provision of goods
to redistribute a given amount of income as eﬃciently as possible. The
limiting case, where public provision should follow only the Samuelson rule,
is when it has no eﬀect on the distribution of ﬁxed costs. In all other cases
the provision rule depends on direction in which public provision aﬀects the
distribution of ﬁxed costs. The participation tax rate ampliﬁes this eﬀect.
1.2.3 What was actually cut in the barbers’ VAT
cut?
As noted in section 1.1.1 of this introduction, there are competing ideas
in economic theory as to how to set consumption taxes optimally. In the
third essay of this thesis I focus on the Ramsey tradition. In this setting
the level of the consumption tax on a good relative to the taxes on other
goods depends on the elasticities of demand and supply for that good and
cross-price elasticities with other goods. Incomplete competition can be
introduced into the model. If a good has inelastic demand and elastic supply
this tends to lead taxes to be forward-shifted completely to consumer prices.
Then there is no change in the amount of goods purchased, since demand
does not react to changes in taxes.
This article aims to estimate empirically how taxes shift to prices and
their eﬀect on demand. I utilise the tax reform that introduced reduced
value added tax (VAT) rates on hairdressers’ services in Finland. The re-
duced VAT is exogenous to the economic conditions of hairdressers, since
this group was selected in the European Commission directive long before
the experiment was implemented in Finland. There are natural control
groups for hairdressers: beauty salons, day spas and masseurs. These are
labour-intensive services like hairdressers, but do not beneﬁt from a reduced
VAT regime.
This study adds to the knowledge about the tax incidence of consump-
tion taxes. Doyle and Samphantharak (2008) study tax incidence on gaso-
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line prices. They have a credible method for revealing the eﬀect of taxes
from regional temporary tax repeals in some regions in the USA. They ﬁnd
100 to 70 per cent pass-through to prices. The results are not directly com-
parable with this study due to the diﬀerent product (gasoline) they study.
There are other studies focusing on the tax incidence of sales taxes on vari-
ous products (Poterba (1996), Besley and Rosen (1999) and Alm, Sennoga
and Skidmore (2009)). These studies give valuable information in a very un-
derstudied subject area. If consumption taxes across diﬀerent commodities
are to be set optimally, there should be knowledge of the demand elasticities
for all the goods categories.
The reduced VAT experiment in Finland oﬀers several advantages in
analysing the tax incidence of VAT. First, since the reform is exogenous to
the behaviour of ﬁrms, it is possible to use a natural experiment set-up in
analysing the eﬀects. The outcomes of the treatment and control groups can
be compared before and after the experiment takes place. Second, the data
contains both remitted taxes and prices for a sample of ﬁrms. Consequently,
it is possible to analyse how VAT aﬀects the demand for labour-intensive
services. Any eﬀect on employment in these services has to go through
changes in demand for the services.
The results indicate about a 50 per cent pass-through to the consumer
price. The response shows interesting heterogeneity according to ﬁrm type
and product type. Turnover evaluated in consumer prices follows the direc-
tion in which consumer prices change, but not to the same extent. From
the sample where prices and turnover information can be linked to the same
ﬁrm, the results for demand do not indicate any signiﬁcant increase due to
the VAT reduction. Thus I conclude that for this group consumption taxes
should not be lower relative to some other services. With little eﬀect on
demand, the eﬀect on employment is negligible.
The interesting feature of the third essay is that the experiment is ex-
ogenous to the economic conditions of the selected industries, making the
results more reliable. Also, the subject is labour-intensive services, for which
lower VAT is claimed to produce large employment eﬀects (EC 1999).
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Chapter 2
The eﬀect of child-care
subsidies on the labour supply
of parents
1
Abstract
This paper studies the eﬀect of child-care subsidies on mater-
nal labour supply. In the Finnish child-care system, parents taking
care of their children at home receive a relatively generous home-care
allowance. I use variation arising from changes in the municipality-
speciﬁc supplement to this allowance to identify the causal eﬀect of
subsidies on the labour force participation of mothers. A munic-
ipal supplement creates plausibly exogenous variation, since being
eligible for it depends on municipal-level rules, but not on changes
in individual labour supply decisions. I ﬁnd a large negative eﬀect
on the labour force participation and income of mothers. 100 euros
more supplement per month reduces the maternal labour supply by
4 per cent. The estimated eﬀect is larger for higher-educated than
for lower-educated mothers.
1Acknowledgments: I am grateful for the ﬁnancial support of the Yrjo¨ Jahnsson
Foundation, the Finnish Cultural Foundation and Palkansaajasa¨a¨tio¨ for costs arising
from a visit to University College London.
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2.1 Introduction
A key question faced by most industrialized countries concerns policy mea-
sures aimed at increasing labour supply. With ageing populations, a smaller
workforce will have to provide for a larger retired share of the population.
At the same time it has proved diﬃcult to extend working lives through
changes in retirement policies (Lindbeck and Persson (2003) and OECD
(2009)). This has led to increased attention towards the study of labour
supply decisions in diﬀerent phases of working age. One important gap in
working lives occurs when parents have children. Mothers in particular may
not participate in the labour force for many years after they give birth.
This paper studies the impact of child-care subsidies on maternal labour
supply. In the Finnish day-care system a relatively generous home-care al-
lowance is given to parents who stay at home to take care of their children.
This subsidy clearly increases incentives to stay outside of the labour force
for prolonged periods. Changes in a municipal supplement to this allowance
provide exogenous variation in the labour supply of mothers. The variation
is exogenous to the labour supply since being eligible for the supplement
does not depend on current labour supply decisions or income prior to
maternity leave. A mother is eligible for a supplement based on the munic-
ipality she lives in and the age of her youngest child.
A municipal supplement to the home-care allowance provides a good
case for using a regional experimental set-up. There are no other regionally
varying policies that aﬀect mothers of young children in Finland. Moreover,
a municipality might oﬀer a supplement simply because it is a popular policy
among voters. The decision to do so is not likely to depend on the municipal
employment situation. There is, however, a worry that a supplement policy
could be endogenous to the labour supply. After presenting the estimation
approach, I discuss institutional reasons and empirical evidence showing
that policy endogeneity does not cause a threat to the identiﬁcation strategy.
The main results show that increasing the supplement has signiﬁcant
negative labour supply and earned income eﬀects. The estimated eﬀect
indicates that 4 per cent fewer mothers participate when a supplement is
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increased by 100 euros per month. Surprisingly, I ﬁnd a larger eﬀect for
higher-educated than for lower-educated mothers. To put these reduced-
form estimates into a policy context, I estimate participation elasticity using
exogenous variation as an instrument. The results indicate a participation
elasticity of 0.9 for all mothers. These ﬁndings survive a battery of sensi-
tivity and robustness checks. I perform all estimates for fathers as well, but
do not ﬁnd any eﬀect on their labour supply.
In comparison with previous studies, a municipal supplement provides
several attractive features for studying the labour supply eﬀects of a pol-
icy. Having many treatment and control regions allows me to compare very
similar people with each other. For example, Eissa and Liebman (1996)
compared mothers and women without children and Blundell et al. (1998)
compared women across education levels and cohorts, although it is reason-
able to assume that these groups behave in diﬀerent ways. Municipalities
have changed their supplement policies on several occasions. The multiple
reforms introduced at diﬀerent points of time help to distinguish the treat-
ment eﬀect from common macro shocks to treatment or control group. This
would not be the case if the reforms were enacted simultaneously or if there
was only one treated group (Schone (2004) and Baker et al. (2008)).
Saez (2002) deﬁned that the decision to participate depends on the rel-
ative diﬀerence in after-tax income when working and when not. There
can be variation in both, income when working and when not. Most pre-
vious studies (e.g. Baker et al. (2008), Milligan and Stabile (2007) and
Lundin et al. (2008)) utilize exogenous variation in the former: the after-
tax income when working. On the other hand, a municipal supplement
aﬀects the latter: after-tax income when not working. Using this feature,
a municipal supplement allows us to estimate participation elasticity. To
estimate the participation elasticity, the income associated with the coun-
terfactual participation status needs to be simulated for everybody in the
sample. The municipal supplement is used as an instrument for the change
in after-tax income simulated for everybody. The amount of supplement
one is eligible for does not depend on family income. Consequently, the
municipal supplement is a good instrument for the income diﬀerence. The
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resulting IV estimate, the participation elasticity, can be used in tax sim-
ulations analysing the optimality of tax systems (Saez (2001), Saez (2002)
and Immervoll et al. (2007)). The estimated participation elasticity of
0.9 is higher than that used in many simulations. It highlights that the
participation response varies across sub-groups.
An attractive feature of the variation in the municipal supplement is
that in absolute terms it aﬀects individuals from any part of the income
distribution equally when they do not work. Although the income that
the parents would have had when participating is missing, their acquired
education is known. Since education is a good proxy for income, the divided
sample results by education can be used to estimate the eﬀect taxes have
across income distribution. This is interesting since many earlier papers
analysed policies where most of the variation in labour supply incentives
aﬀected the lower end of income distribution (e.g. Eissa and Liebman (1996)
and Milligan and Stabile (2007)). In this case, I am able to estimate the
participation response across the whole income distribution of parents. In
contrast to earlier studies, the divided sample results indicate an increasing
income proﬁle (Eissa and Liebman (1996)).
This study also adds to the literature estimating the labour supply
eﬀects of child-care policies. These policies range from lowered day-care
prices (Lundin et al. (2008), Baker et al. (2008) and Lefebvre and Mer-
rigan (2008)) to the employment responses of maternity leave (Baker et
al. (2008b)) to child-care-related beneﬁts (Milligan and Stabile (2007)2. A
typical ﬁnding is that policies have some eﬀect, although not in all cases3.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2.2, I present
the source of the variation in child-care subsidies. I also provide a short
2Milligan and Stabile (2007) studied the National Child Beneﬁt reform in Canada.
With province-level reforms, the variation that they observed does not arise from a single
treated group, a problem in many of the articles cited above. Their results indicate an
elasticity of 0.96 from having earnings as a major source of income, which is comparable
to what I ﬁnd.
3Lundin et al. (2008) do not ﬁnd any employment eﬀect from a Swedish reform that
put a cap on child-care prices. Similarly, Havnes and Mogstad (2009) do not ﬁnd that a
Norwegian day-care reform had any eﬀect on maternal labour supply. This is interesting,
since the Swedish and Norwegian child-care institutions are similar to those in Finland,
except that Finland has a signiﬁcant home care-allowance system.
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description of the Finnish child-care system. The identiﬁcation issues and
the econometric speciﬁcation are discussed in section 2.3. In section 2.4,
there is a description of the data-set and the descriptive statistics. The
estimation results are given in section 2.5. In the same section there are
some robustness checks. A discussion of the economic interpretation of the
results and an estimation of participation elasticity are presented in section
2.6. Section 2.7 discusses the economic policy implications of a supplement.
The last section concludes the study. The appendices contain the tables
and ﬁgures referred to in the text.
2.2 Forms of child care
Child care can be structured in many ways. To understand the particular
features of the Finnish institutions, I ﬁrst compare these to the arrange-
ments in other countries. I then describe the Finnish day-care system in
more detail and discuss how the institutions result in exogenous variation
in the labour supply of parents.
2.2.1 How is Finland doing compared to other
countries?
The Nordic countries provide extensive public day-care and parental leave
policies. Children are entitled to a place in a public day-care centre. The
price for day-care is heavily subsidized by the government. In Anglo-Saxon
and central European countries day-care relies more on private providers.
The price a household ends up paying for day-care can be much higher
than in the Nordic countries. Parental leave policies are provided in the
Nordic countries for parents whose youngest child is under one year old
(with national variation). This is much more than in the other OECD
countries in general. In Finland the home-care allowance continues for as
long as two years after maternity leave. The home-care allowance works in
a similar way to parental leave: one has the right to return to one’s previous
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work place after the leave and there is a subsidy from the government to
the mother.
A key feature that countries try to inﬂuence through their child-care
institutions is the employment rate of mothers. Figure A1 presents maternal
employment rates by the age of the youngest child in selected countries in
2005. It is evident that the Nordic countries have higher employment rates
than the OECD countries on average.
The ﬁrst column in ﬁgure A1 shows the employment rate of mothers
whose youngest child is under 3 years old. This column stands out for
Finland even compared to the other Nordic countries. In contrast to Sweden
and Denmark, Finland provides a home-care allowance for this group. I
hypothesize that the Finnish home-care allowance system has an eﬀect from
on the labour supply of parents. When mothers are no longer eligible for
this allowance, their employment rate shoots back to the high level seen in
the other columns in ﬁgure A1.
2.2.2 Finnish day care
The idea of the Finnish child-care system has been to provide ﬁnancial as-
sistance to parents regardless of the choice a parent makes. After maternity
leave (when the newborn child is 10 months old), parents can choose es-
sentially between three child-care alternatives, all of which are ﬁnancially
subsidized by the government: home care, public day care or private day
care.
Public day care is the predominant choice in Finland for a typical family.
Every child under the age of 7 (when they start primary school) is entitled
to a public day-care place if requested4. Day-care fees (DC) are regulated
by the government - a typical family with two children in public day care
paid 380 euros per month in 2005. Private day care is also subsidized5.
4This is stated in legislation. Before 1995 the law stated that every child under the
age of 4 is entitled to public day care.
5This system has been in place nationwide since 1997. Between 1995 and 1997 there
was an experiment in 33 municipalities that provided a similar allowance. Viitanen (2007)
describes this experiment in detail. She found a positive eﬀect on the use of private day
care, but little eﬀect on labour force participation.
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Furthermore, municipalities are able to pay a municipal supplement on top
of the private day-care allowance if they choose to.
This study focuses on the employment eﬀect of the home-care allowance
and a supplement to it. Thus, the point of interest is not whether a family
chooses private or public day care. These two choices are similar in terms
of the employment decision.
When a child under 3 years of age is cared for by a parent, he or she is
entitled to the child home-care allowance (HCA). This national allowance
can be paid until the youngest child not in public or private day care reaches
the age of 3. The amount depends on the family’s characteristics and is from
300 to 500 euros per month. The child home-care allowance may be paid
to either parent, although it is predominantly the mother who takes up the
allowance.
A municipal supplement (S) to the home-care allowance constitutes an
interesting variation in this study. Some municipalities have decided to
pay a supplement on top of the national home-care allowance while other
municipalities have no supplement policy. The municipal supplement has
been part of the Finnish child-care system since the 1980’s. The observation
period reaches from 1995 to 2005. Over this period, there were around 450
municipalities of which 5 had adopted a supplement policy in the beginning,
rising to 65 at the end. Figure A2 shows how the municipal supplement
has spread over time. There is also a map showing the population in each
municipality. Clearly the group oﬀering a supplement contains bigger cities
than the group that does not, but there are cities in the group that does
not have the supplement policy.
A parent faces who works faces diﬀerent fee and subsidy schemes than
a parent who does not. Below the fees and subsidies when a parent is in
work (Iwork) and when not (INotwork) are described:
Iwork = Earned(I)−DC(I) (2.1)
INotwork = HCA(I) + S ∗ 1(m = 1, childage < 3, other) (2.2)
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where Earned refers to earned income net of tax, DC to day care fees,
HCA to home-care allowance and S to the supplement to it. The I in
parentheses indicates that the fee or subsidy is a function of personal or
family income. The eligibility for the supplement depends on municipal
level rules, but not on income (in most cases).
Although there are strict national rules about how municipalities have
to provide child care, municipalities may choose their supplement policies
relatively freely. Thus there is a lot of variation in the details of how each
municipality pays its supplement. Typically a municipal supplement is paid
per child. It is possible to receive an extra supplement if the youngest child
has older siblings. The mean monthly supplement level in the data is 200
euros and the mean sibling extra supplement is 50 euros per family. With
the exception of a few municipalities, the municipal supplement does not
depend on family income. There is also a prior-work condition in some
smaller municipalities, according to which to be entitled to the municipal
supplement the parent must have worked prior to going on parental leave.
For what reasons do municipalities pay supplements to the home-care
allowance? The literature does not say much about the reasons why munici-
palities provide a supplement. Typically municipal councils use assessments
made by civil servants in municipality to indicate what would happen if a
supplement is implemented in municipality. These assessments typically
compare the costs arising from placing all the children in an age group to
public day care or to home care taking the potential supplement into ac-
count. These assessments typically do not take the labour supply decisions
of parents into account. Some municipality councils may also appreciate
the idea of a parent taking care of young children themselves instead of a
paid nurse.
2.3 Identiﬁcation and econometric strategy
To estimate the eﬀect of a municipal supplement on maternal outcomes, I
apply a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences (DD) and a triple diﬀerence approach. In
the DD strategy I compare outcomes for mothers living in diﬀerent munic-
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ipalities before and after there was a change in supplement policy. Mothers
living in a municipality that did not change its supplement policy comprise
the control group. A supplement policy is measured as the actual supple-
ment a mother is eligible to based on her observable characteristics. Thus
it is not a dummy variable as in the basic DD approach. The model is
estimated for mothers with children between 9 months and 3 years old. In
the triple-diﬀerence estimation the third diﬀerence is whether or not the
youngest child is under 3 years old. This distinction is meaningful, since
the upper age limit for the youngest child to receive a supplement is 3 years
old. I estimate the OLS equation:
Yiym = α + β1Piym + β2Xiym + β3Munm + β4Y eary +  iym (2.3)
The dependent variable is labour supply or earned income, Y . In the
labour supply case it is a dummy variable with a value of 1 when a par-
ent participates and zero otherwise and in the earned income case it is a
continuous variable. The key explanatory variable is P (eligibility to munic-
ipal supplement). The model identiﬁes β1, the eﬀect of a subsidy Piym on
labour supply Yiym in year y, municipality m and individual i. In the case
of labour supply, β1 shows the change in probability of a parent supplying
labour when P is increased by one unit. The other variables in equation
(4.3) are the municipalMunm and year Y eary dummies and a control vector
Xiym. When estimating the triple diﬀerence, the control vector includes the
interaction terms of the dummies used in the DD approach. Any change in
P is allocated to a simultaneous change in Y . The only reason for a change
in Y should be that there is a change in P , conditional on the covariates.
Since P varies in the municipality and year dimensions, the identiﬁcation
relies on municipal and year-level changes. That is why the controls include
municipal-level variables such as average unemployment rate and share of
children in day care relative to the number of children in a municipality.
The control vector also includes individual-level variables to cope with the
individual-level variation. This should reduce variation in the error term.
Changes in a municipality’s supplement rules depend on the age of the
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youngest child. Simultaneously a mother’s decision to return to work is cor-
related with the age of the youngest child. Consequently, β1 would be biased
away from zero if this correlation were not taken into account. Municipal
supplement rules regarding the youngest child’s age vary considerably. In
some cases the upper age limit for eligibility is raised gradually from 1 year
and 2 months to 2 years. Thus to be able to control for this variation in a
ﬂexible way, I needed to include dummies for the age of the youngest child.
In the main estimates a dummy for each 3 months of age of the youngest
child controls away all the unwanted correlation between policy rules and
child’s age. Other speciﬁcations for the length of the age interval in the
dummy produce similar results as in the main estimates.
2.3.1 Identiﬁcation issues
The DD approach identiﬁes a causal eﬀect of the municipal supplement on
outcome Y provided that certain assumptions hold. I use the standard DD
assumption that selection into treatment should be exogenous to outcome.
In particular, the model identiﬁes β1 conditional on controls if the following
condition holds:
E[Y 0iym|m, y, Piym, Xiym] = E[Y 0iym|m, y,Xiym] =  m + y + β1Xiym (2.4)
where I note the outcome of the control group by Y 0iym. The assumption
that guarantees the identiﬁcation here is that Piym (eligibility to supple-
ment) is exogenous to Y 0iym (labour supply). Also, the aggregate employ-
ment time trends should be parallel between the treatment and control
groups. It seems credible that mothers within a municipality do not self
select into treatment, since the municipal supplement is oﬀered to everyone
living in a municipality with children of the correct age. There would be a
problem with identiﬁcation if changes in a supplement would induce moth-
ers to be more fertile. This seems unlikely that fertility is a problem from
the identiﬁcation point if view, since a change in supplement potentially
aﬀects employment this year. Potential increase in fertility would lead to
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increased number of 1 year old children two years from the change in sup-
plement. Finally the composition of the groups ought to be similar; people
are not expected to move from municipality to other based on changes in
supplement policy. After the estimation results I present some robustness
checks as a defense against these potential problems.
”How Much Should We Trust Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences Estimates” is a
question raised by Bertrand et al. (2004). Their simulations show that
potential problems with inconsistent standard errors are less severe if there
are many treated and control groups and the reforms are implemented at
diﬀerent points of time. One virtue of analysing the Finnish home-care
allowance system is that there are over 400 municipalities, 65 of which had
supplement policies in 2005. The reforms were implemented at diﬀerent
points of time.
2.3.2 Policy endogeneity
One potential problem here is policy endogeneity, as discussed by Card
and Levine (2000) and Lalive and Zweimuller (2004). The main worry
is that a shock to municipal economy leads to a change in supplement
rules. In this case it might appear that the supplement has an eﬀect to an
economic outcome, such as employment, when in reality there is no causal
eﬀect. Fortunately for the identiﬁcation, there are institutional reasons and
empirical evidence against policy endogeneity hypothesis.
Municipal councils usually make the decision to implement a supple-
ment based on assessment made by civil servants working in the municipal
government. The assessment typically includes calculations about ﬁnancial
situation of the municipality, how many children would be aﬀected by the
new policy and how large are the costs of the new policy to the public day
care in the municipality. After having the report the municipal council deals
with the proposal and if it is approved, the municipal government makes
the ﬁnal decision in their meeting. This whole process takes time and the
civil servants have inﬂuence to the decision implying that quick changes
based on sudden shocks or political desires are not likely to be possible to
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implement. The identiﬁcation in this paper relies on the eﬀects of sudden
changes in municipal policy. This implies that the slow decision process is
one defense against policy endogeneity because the shock to the municipal
economy is unlikely to aﬀect the supplement policy quickly, whereas .
As to why municipalities want to implement supplement policies, it
seems the main reasons are attempting to reduce the number of children in
public day care and having an image of child-friendly municipality. This rea-
soning still does not guarantee that the policy endogeneity is not present.
Therefore, as a further evidence against policy endogeneity hypothesis, I
describe below how municipal level data behaves prior to implementing a
supplement policy.
Figure A4 and table A1 presents coeﬃcients from a ﬁxed-eﬀects regres-
sion on municipal-level data where indicator of implementation of supple-
ment to home care allowance (1(implem)) explains number of dependent
variables (Ytm) in year t and municipality m. The regression model used is:
Ytm = αm + β−21(implemt−2,m) + β−11(implemt−1,m) + β01(implemt,m)
+β11(implemt+1,m) + β21(implemt+2,m) +X
′
tmζ + tm
I have included leads and lags of the implementation indicator variable
(1(implemt−2,m) - 1(implemt+2,m)) and year ﬁxed eﬀects and in some cases
number of children as covariates (X ′tm). Evidence of policy endogeneity
emerges if I ﬁnd that there are shocks to dependent variables prior to im-
plementation of the supplement. The identiﬁcation strategy used in the
micro-level analysis uses municipal level ﬁxed eﬀects. Therefore level dif-
ferences between municipalities are not endangering identiﬁcation, shocks
prior to implementing a supplement are.
The ﬁrst dependent variable in both the table and the ﬁgure is the extent
of resources in euros a municipality uses to the supplement. The idea of this
variable is to show that the supplement policy rules aﬀect the dependent
variable when they should. Figure A4 shows results of three other variables:
Number of babies (aged 0 or 1 years), Net costs of municipality in all local
government activities and the Employment rate of women. The important
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fact to take away from the ﬁgure is that there are no signiﬁcant variation in
coeﬃcients of implementation variables prior to implementation of a sup-
plement. The stable coeﬃcients indicate that a municipal supplement was
not implemented in response to a sudden change in economics conditions
that these variables describe.
Women are a relevant group as a potential future treatment group, there-
fore their employment rate describes important economic conditions for the
analysis. Majority of women are not mothers of 1-2 years old children in
any one point of time. Thus women in general are much more general group
than sub-group of mothers who have small children.
Table A1 shows leads and lags from regressions with other dependent
variables: in column (2) cost of child care to municipality in log euros,
in column (3) logarithm of number of children in private care, in column
(4) logarithm of number of children receiving home care allowance, in col-
umn (5) employment rate and in column (6) logarithm of migration to a
municipality. Number of children receiving home care allowance could be
aﬀected after the municipality implements supplement to it. Indeed there
is slight increase in this variable one year after the municipality implements
the supplement. The evidence against policy endogeneity in these results
is that there does not seem to be signiﬁcant variation in coeﬃcients prior
to implementation of the supplement. More rigorous robustness tests are
performed with micro data after the main estimation results.
2.4 Data and descriptive statistics
The main data set in this study is individual-level micro data for the years
1994 to 2005. The data comes from multiple sources. The base data,
Income Distribution Statistics (IDS), comes from Statistics Finland and
is individual-level data, containing over 25,000 observations from about
10,000 households per year from a population of about 5 million Finns.
The main estimation sample includes families whose youngest child is be-
tween 9 months and 3 years old. Pooled for all years, there are about 6,000
households in this group and about 14,000 households that have children
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under the age of 6. In the data there is a rich set of variables describ-
ing family characteristics, demographics, incomes and beneﬁts derived from
registers and surveys. The rest of the information is at the municipal level
and has been linked to IDS data. It comes from a survey of municipalities
conducted by the University of Turku, a survey of municipalities conducted
by the author, from the Social Insurance Institution of Finland and from
Statistics Finland. The data is a repeated cross section at the individual
level, although there is a rotating panel system6. Aggregated to the munic-
ipal level, the data is a panel where each municipality can be followed over
the years.
Table A2 shows descriptive statistics derived from the data. It catego-
rizes mothers according to the age of their youngest child. Mothers in the
main estimation sample, shown in the ﬁrst column, are on average 32 years
old and have at least high school education almost 50 per cent of the time.
The most typical families are those with one or two children, but there are
also larger families in the data.
The outcome variables in this study are employment rate and earned in-
come. I construct the employment rate using earned income statistics. The
data for these variables originally come from tax records and are on annual
basis. I deﬁne mothers as employed when their annual income is higher
than half the mean income of women who are between 22 and 55 years old
and not disabled from working or retired7. The employment trend of moth-
ers according to this variable by the age of the youngest child is shown in
ﬁgure A5. This shows clearly how the employment rate of mothers increases
with the age of the youngest child. From this ﬁgure it is clear that the em-
ployment rate of mothers is correlated with the age of the youngest child.
The ﬁgure also shows the share of those receiving a municipal supplement
relative to all mothers in the sample by the age of the youngest child. It is
noticeable how the two lines have opposite slopes.
6In rotating panel each household is surveyed in two consecutive years and each
year half of the sample consists of new households. Thus there are two consecutive
observations for each individual. The data is a panel at the municipal level.
7This speciﬁcation ensures that I calculate the mean income from a population that
is mainly in the labour force.
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The explanatory variable used in the main estimations is a supplement to
the home-care allowance. In estimating participation elasticity, the home-
care allowance, day care fees and family income are also used as dependent
variables to measure the change in after-tax incomes associated with entry.
The amount one is eligible for is imputed to everyone in the sample using
observable characteristics (family size, age of children and municipality they
live in) and the eligibility rules. These rules are described in section 2.2.
To make income uncorrelated with actual working status, it is imputed for
those not being in work based on observable characteristics and the incomes
of those who are in work. Two after tax incomes are calculated for each
family, one corresponds to the mother not being in work and the other to
the mother being in work. If there are multiple children the only scenario
calculated is one where all the children are treated similarly.
The mean values, standard deviations and number of observations of
supplement and employment rate are shown in table A3. In the table,
the share receiving supplement column describes the size of the share of
the sample that is eligible for a supplement. The table contains statistics
of mothers whose youngest child is between 9 months and 3 years old,
and for selected years. Table A3 is divided to two parts: the left panel
contains everybody in the sample for the year in question, and the right
panel contains only those who live in a municipality with a supplement
policy in place in the year in question. From the table it is evident that it
has become more common to be entitled to receive a supplement. Over the
same time period, the mean amount of supplement has changed for those
receiving it. The average monthly supplement is around 200 euros towards
the end of the observation period. Mothers do not on average have a very
high participation rate, and this is also reﬂected in their low gross incomes.
The right panel only contains those receiving a supplement that year. It is
interesting to note that the employment rate and the mean gross income
have fallen over time relative to the whole sample in the left panel.
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2.5 Estimation results
Table B1 shows the main estimation results. The dependent variables are
the mothers’ labour supply dummy and earned income. The monetary
variables (like the municipal supplement and earned income) are in 100
euros per month. I perform all the estimations for fathers as well and ﬁnd
zero eﬀect on their labour supply.
The results in table B1 are organized as follows: there are two panels,
top and bottom, which are divided according to the dependent variable.
The top panel presents the results for the employment dummy, which is
coded as 1 if the earned income is more than half the average income of
working-age women. In the bottom panel the dependent variable is earned
income. In column (i) there is a plain regression of municipal supplement
on the dependent variable. Column (ii) presents a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
(DD) estimate, including year and municipal-level dummies, dummies for
the age of the youngest child for every three month intervals, and a number
of control variables. By controlling away municipal-level diﬀerences, the
results become more signiﬁcant and negative. Column (iii) presents the
triple diﬀerence results. The third diﬀerence is between having the youngest
child in the age group of 9 months to 2 years or of 3 to 5 years. The latter
age group is never entitled to a supplement to the home-care allowance. An
advantage of the triple-diﬀerence estimate is that it allows controlling for
municipality-speciﬁc time trends.
The main result for the work-dummy indicates that increasing the mu-
nicipal supplement by 100 euros per month causes 4% fewer mothers to
participate. The main result for income indicates that increasing the mu-
nicipal supplement by 100 euros per month decreases the annual income by
1190 euros8. Since there is probably some variation in the way in which
mothers respond to the municipal supplement, I interpret these results as
the average treatment eﬀect on the treated.
The result in column (iii) seems to be robust with quite a ﬂexible set
8The average net income per month for a woman working full time is around 1410
  (own calculations).
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of control variables. As a sensitivity check I tried to include a linear time
trend for every municipality, use another deﬁnition for the work dummy9
and exclude some individual municipalities or years. Tables C2 and C3 show
some of the results. Since the point estimate does not change much when
conditioned on municipal-level variables, the result does not depend directly
on the macroeconomic conditions of the municipality. The coeﬃcient of the
supplement is in general quite robust to controlling for many individual and
municipal-level eﬀects. However, one variable deserves special attention;
age of the youngest child. Since this variable is closely correlated with the
employment of mothers and the treatment is not constant within the age of
the youngest child, it turns out to be important to include this covariate.
There are various threats to identifying true average treatment eﬀect on
the treated with the chosen strategy, as discussed in the identiﬁcation sec-
tion. I perform robustness checks in table B2 to check if there is a problem
with identiﬁcation. Column (i) introduces a pseudo-rule that makes mothers
whose youngest child is between 3 to 5 years old eligible for the municipal
supplement if they live in a supplement municipality. The estimates are
otherwise similar to those in table B1, column (ii) for the work-dummy
outcome. Families with older children appear natural candidates for per-
forming a robustness check on, since their characteristics should otherwise
be close to families that just have a little younger child. The zero result
here indicates that a supplement policy does not have a delayed eﬀect on
mothers employment. The result is in line with OECD (2007) statistics
that indicate that the employment of mothers with children of this age is
much higher than the employment of mothers with younger children.
Column (ii) of table B2 presents a robustness check for a diﬀerent group:
women who are going to have a child the following year. Here I utilize the
rotating panel feature of the data. The model is estimated for families that
will have a child aged 9 months or younger the following year, but do not
currently have any children between 9 months and 3 years old. Thus, they
9The other deﬁnition is the number of months worked as based on a survey question.
The results for this are shown in table C1. There is a measurement error in this variable,
thus I did not use it in the main estimates.
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are not yet entitled to municipal supplement, but live in municipalities that
have the policy. This estimate should tell something about the potential
anticipation eﬀect. However, the coeﬃcient of the supplement is zero. This
indicates that there is no serious anticipation eﬀect (although the sample
size is only 533 in this estimate).
Column (iii) checks if there is a higher probability of ending up in the
estimation sample associated with changes in a supplement policy. The
outcome is a dummy indicating whether or not a person is a child under
three years old (who are usually those who are entitled to a supplement).
This model is estimated for everyone in the data. The result shows that
the supplement does not have any eﬀect in terms of causing children to
end up in the estimation sample. Thus families with small children do not
seem to move to municipalities oﬀering a supplement10. Moreover, mothers
in supplement municipalities do not seem to be more fertile because of
the supplement. Column (iv) presents a base-line estimation, but with the
simpliﬁed rules needed for the implementation of a supplement used in other
robustness checks. The coeﬃcient of the municipal supplement is similar to
main estimates, and the simpliﬁcation of rules does not seem to aﬀect the
estimates.
The treatment eﬀect may also be heterogeneous. To check for this, I
divided the sample according to two dimensions: the number of children
in a family and the mother’s education. The results are shown in table
B3. The dependent variable is the mothers’ labour supply dummy and the
supplement is measured in 100 euros per month.
The interesting thing in these results is that the result is much stronger
for families with 1 or 2 children (coeﬃcient is more signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero) and the coeﬃcient for larger families, although non-signiﬁcant,
is actually positive. It is surprising that for the higher education group,
where mothers have an educational qualiﬁcation higher than high school,
the coeﬃcient is larger than for the lower education group11. Eissa and
10Finnish municipalities are typically large in surface are. Thus, moving to another
municipality usually means moving to a completely diﬀerent city or town.
11This diﬀerence is somewhat smaller when the income of a spouse is controlled for,
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Liebman (1996) found a larger estimate for their lower education group.
However, the reform analysed by Eissa and Liebman was Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC) reform targeted to working poor. It is therefore not
surprising if they found small eﬀect for higher educated mothers. The mu-
nicipal supplement, in contrast, is based on the municipality a mother lives
in. Consequently, the amount one is eligible to does not depend on the
education one has. The supplement thus provides a good way to analyse
participation responses across education levels.
The result that those with higher education respond more is surprising,
since in the literature the opposite is assumed (Saez 2002 and Eissa et al.
2008). Education is usually taken as a proxy for income or at least the
capability to earn higher income. The result in table B3 can be interpreted
as mothers with higher earnings responding on average more than those with
lower earnings. In the literature on optimal income taxes with an extensive
margin of labour supply it is usually assumed that the poor have higher
participation elasticity than the rich (see e.g. Saez 2002 and Immervoll et
al. 2007). This assumption is usually made when simulating the welfare
eﬀects of a tax reform across income distribution. If at the same time the
participation tax rate is high at the bottom of the income distribution,
the assumption about a declining participation elasticity proﬁle makes an
EITC-type tax proﬁle more attractive.
2.6 Participation elasticity
This section presents the participation elasticity results. It is interesting
to put the eﬀect of a supplement on labour supply in a policy-relevant
context. The participation elasticity is a parameter that can be used for this.
For instance, in optimal income tax models taking the extensive margin
into account there is an inverse elasticity rule that uses the inverse of the
participation elasticity analysed here (Saez 2002).
To estimate the participation elasticity, I need to calculate net after-tax
but still exists
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income associated with participation for everybody. For this, I need to know
two income numbers for every mother. One measures after-tax income when
not working and taking care of children and the other measures after-tax
income when working and having children in public day care. The incomes
used in the analysis corresponding each choice are shown in equations (2.1)
and (2.2). The net after-tax income is formed by taking the diﬀerence of
these two measures. I need to make assumptions here, and one of them is
that the two choices just described are the only ones available to mothers
in respect of taking care of their children.
One of the two incomes is always non-observable for a person. A typ-
ical solution to this is to simulate the two income measures for everybody
based on pre-determined characteristics. I use information in the data set
about incomes for those in work to predict incomes based on the observable
characteristics including age, education and gender.
The diﬀerence in these would itself suﬀer from an endogeneity problem.
Therefore I use the municipal supplement as an instrument for the change
in after-tax incomes associated with participation. The various robustness
checks presented in the previous section contribute to validating the use of
this instrument. To be a good instrument, the municipal supplement should
be exogenous to the labour supply of an individual. On the other hand, it
should directly aﬀect the income one gets when the change in participation
status is made. The coeﬃcient should have a positive sign because the
subsidies enter the income equation with a negative sign.
The results are shown in table B4. The explanatory variable is again a
dummy for participation status. Now the unit is 1 euro per year. The ﬁrst
stage, shown in the ﬁrst line, is very strong. There is almost a one-to-one
relationship between change in incomes and the amount of supplement one
is eligible to. The second stage results from 2SLS suggests that the amount
mothers gain when they participate leads to an increase in participation
probability of .0028 % for each additional euro per year.
The participation elasticity (η) implied by the coeﬃcient in the table
B4 can be calculated as
38
2.7. Policy implications
η =
dparticipation
dincome
∗ income
participation
=
β ∗ income
participation
= 0.0000277 ((11600)/(0.355)) = 0.91
The above elasticity is calculated on an annual basis. The 11,600 euros
is the average change in net income associated with labour market entry for
a typical mother. The 0.355 is the average participation rate in the popula-
tion for which the estimation was made. Table B5 shows the participation
eﬀect by education level. The result is signiﬁcant only for mothers with
a university degree or higher. The participation elasticity implied by that
estimate is 1.48 with a mean yearly income of about 16,000 euros and a par-
ticipation rate of 0.61. The results for other education groups imply a lower
participation elasticity than in the main estimate for the whole population.
The estimate is performed more structurally here than in other studies
analyzing child-care beneﬁts and prices (Baker et al. (2008) and Milligan
and Stabile (2007)). Here the change in net after-tax income associated with
entry is taken explicitly into account. This is possible since supplements
do not directly depend on income. To report some earlier estimates in the
literature, Baker et al. (2008) estimated a participation elasticity of 0.236
resulting from decreasing child-care cost, and Milligan and Stabile (2007)
reported an elasticity of 0.96 for having earnings as a major source of income
utilising the Canadian beneﬁt reform. Eissa and Liebman (1996) estimated
a participation elasticity of 0.6 for single mothers.
2.7 Policy implications
This section presents crude calculations of the economic implications of
supplement policies. Based on the estimates in this paper and aggregate
municipal-level statistics, it is possible to look at how desirable a supplement
policy is from the municipal point of view and the total economy point of
view. To be able to fully assess the optimality of the policy, I would need
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an estimate of the welfare of individuals and the eﬀects of the policy on
other groups, most notably children.
To make the calculations certain assumptions need to be made. I only
present results for mothers. This is justiﬁed because I ﬁnd that fathers do
not often take up supplements and that the estimated labour supply eﬀect
for them is zero. I assume that the children are put in public day care in the
cases where the mother works, which is the prevalent choice in Finland. I
need to calculate the eﬀect on an average mother. To this end, based on my
own calculations from the data, I assume that a mother has 1,4 children,
has a spouse who is in work, earns 1600 euros per month when working and
faces municipal and national income tax rates of 16 per cent and 25 per
cent respectively.
I compare the situations where a mother is in work and where she is
not in work from a government expenditure point of view. If a mother
works, she pays on average 500 euros in taxes and 280 euros per 1.4 children
in day care fees per month. But, the day-care costs to the government
are 1300 euros per month. If the mother does not work, she receives 300
euros in home-care allowance per month. Summing these rough estimates
(500+280-1300 = - 522 euros compared to -300 euros), it seems that without
a municipal supplement it is less costly for the government if the mother
does not work. This result is driven mainly by the high cost of public
day care to the government. These calculations would look diﬀerent if the
longer-term eﬀects were taken into account. Then lost pension savings and
the eﬀects of deteriorating working skills would be taken into account.
From the municipality point of view, it might seem lucrative to keep
mothers out of work. Municipalities receive less tax revenues than the
national government, but need to cover the expenses of public day care.
However, it might not be optimal for the municipality to provide a supple-
ment. Even with a fairly large participation elasticity estimate, the costs of
increasing a supplement are larger than the gains. This can be seen from a
simple example. Assume there are 1000 mothers in a municipality, of whom
355 are in work and the rest are taking care of their children. Increasing
the home-care allowance by 100 euros per month via a supplement would
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on average induce 40 more mothers to stay at home and not work. The
amount of public funds saved from day-care costs is 40*(1300-280)=40,800
euros. At the same time the municipality would need to pay the supplement
to every mother already staying at home. The cost of the new policy is then
685*100=68,500 euros. Thus this rough example shows quite clearly that
municipalities lose out in reforms introducing a supplement to the home-
care allowance.
2.8 Conclusion
This paper presents evidence on the extent to which child-care beneﬁts af-
fect the maternal labour supply. An important component of this study is
a particular feature of the Finnish child-care system: a municipal supple-
ment to the child home-care allowance. This provides plausibly exogenous
variation to the labour supply of mothers.
To be entitled to a municipal supplement a parent needs to stay at home
taking care of children, the children must be below a speciﬁed age limit and
live in a municipality that has the policy in place. Because of regional policy
reforms, the control group and the treatment group consist of very similar
mothers. The municipalities changed their policies many times during the
observation period.
I found that a municipal supplement to the home-care allowance has a
negative eﬀect on the labour supply decision of mothers. The main estimate
indicated that increasing a municipal supplement by 100 euros per month
causes 4 per cent fewer women to participate. I did not ﬁnd any eﬀect on
the labour supply of fathers.
To put the results into a policy relevant context, I estimated the par-
ticipation elasticity. In the estimation the eﬀect of changes in incomes as-
sociated with entry was regressed on the probability of entering the labour
force. The municipal supplement was used as an instrument of the changes
in incomes. It is a good instrument, since it clearly aﬀects the changes in
incomes when entering the labour market. At the same time prior analysis
has established that supplements are exogenous to labour supply. The re-
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sult implies a participation elasticity of around 0.9. This estimate is towards
the high end of the elasticities found in other studies for the population as a
whole. It thus conﬁrms the idea that the participation response is larger for
mothers than for the rest of the population (Blundell and Macurdy 1999).
The eﬀect estimated describes to what extent a certain monetary amount
aﬀects participation. It is therefore surprising to ﬁnd a larger eﬀect for those
with higher education, which contrasts with the result found by Eissa and
Liebman (1996). This is interesting in itself. Also, when education is taken
as a proxy for income, one would expect that those with higher potential
earnings would be less responsive to the same monetary incentives than
those with lower potential earnings. In studies where the eﬀects of a tax
reform are simulated, it is assumed that a participation elasticity proﬁle is
declining in income (e.g. Saez 2002 and Immervoll et al. 2007). The result
obtained in this study implies that the participation response may be high
towards the middle and high end of the income distribution, not just at the
bottom end of the distribution. Since for example the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC) is targeted towards the working poor, this ﬁnding may have
implications regarding the optimality of an EITC-type reform.
The results also show that when the home-care allowance period ends,
mothers return to employment. Thus the policy does not seem to have a
delayed eﬀect.
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2.A Appendix Tables and Figures
All the tables and ﬁgures are in this appendix.
Figure A1: The employment rate of mothers by the age of the youngest
child. Source: OECD (2007).
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Figure A2: Maps of Finland showing municipalities having a supplement
policy in selected years
Note: The above maps of Finland show municipalities with a supplement policy
marked in red. The maps correspond to the situations in 1995, 1998, 2001 and
2005 respectively.
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32773 - 58982
58983 - 127226
127227 - 227472
227473 - 559046
Figure A3: Map showing the population of each municipality in 2005
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Figure A4: Leads and lags of regression coeﬃcients when a supplement
to home care allowance was implemented in a municipality. 4 diﬀerent
dependent variables.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARS Supplem. CareCost Priv.care Homecare Empl Migrate
implem.-2 -0.95*** 0.017 -0.068 0.0033 0.0065** -0.005
(0.08) (0.022) (0.069) (0.013) (0.0033) (0.028)
implem.-1 -1.06*** 0.018 -0.103 -0.0084 0.0069** -0.015
(0.08) (0.022) (0.069) (0.013) (0.0033) (0.031)
implem. 2.56*** 0.005 -0.07 6.6e-05 0.0109*** -0.023
(0.08) (0.021) (0.07) (0.013) (0.0034) (0.036)
implem.+1 3.14*** -0.004 -0.162** 0.0244* 0.0076* -0.021
(0.1) (0.022) (0.079) (0.0145) (0.004) (0.036)
implem.+2 2.54*** 0.014 -0.039 0.0182 0.0066 -0.042
(0.11) (0.025) (0.086) (0.0157) (0.0044) (0.041)
Constant -5.96*** 5.22*** -3.86*** -1.17*** 3.58*** 3.34***
(0.51) (0.13) (0.55) (0.1) (0.00) (0.187)
N 4057 4173 3406 3406 4494 3430
R2 0.49 0.18 0.06 0.64 0.8 0.26
N of Mun 290 321 319 319 321 312
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A1: Leads and lags of coeﬃcient having value 1 when municipality
implements supplement to home care allowance
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Youngest child Youngest child
9 mon. to 2 yo. 3 to 7 yo.
Mean Sd Mean Sd
Number of obs. 5709 8411
Age 32.09 (5.26) 36.24 (5.40)
Earned income 7726 (10510) 14983 (12979)
Employment rate 0.35 (0.48) 0.65 (0.48)
Education N/A 0.11 0.12
Basic education 0.42 0.43
Higher education 0.26 0.26
Bachelor or higher 0.21 0.18
N of children under 7 1.65 (0.70) 1.24 (0.45)
Table A2: Descriptive statistics
Note: Mean level of descriptive statistics. The standard deviations of the means are given
in the second column, where applicable. The left panel contains the group of families
where the youngest child is between 10 months and 3 years of age and the right panel
contains families where the youngest child is between 3 and 7 years of age.
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Figure A5: Employment rate of mothers by the age of youngest child and
proportion receiving a supplement.
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All Conditional on
receiving supplement
Year Share Employ- Earned N Supple- Employ- Earned N
receives ment income ment ment income
supplement rate rate
1995 0.06 0.36 6305 761 120 0.46 7881 46
0.24 0.48 8294 30 0.50 9754
1997 0.12 0.42 8244 761 185 0.40 7448 91
0.32 0.49 10016 71 0.49 8102
1999 0.17 0.37 7941 693 206 0.39 8491 116
0.37 0.48 10306 83 0.49 9997
2001 0.20 0.39 8932 713 212 0.35 7216 145
0.40 0.49 10554 76 0.48 8906
2003 0.20 0.37 9452 667 204 0.30 9029 132
0.40 0.48 12735 67 0.46 14672
2005 0.23 0.36 9466 638 190 0.32 7453 144
0.42 0.48 11989 75 0.47 9374
Table A3: Outcome and treatment variables
Note: The left panel contains all observations for the selected years and the right panel
only those who are eligible for a supplement in that year. The standard deviations are
given in italics below the mean values.
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2.B Estimation Results
Outcome Coeﬃcient (i) (ii) (iii)
Work Supplement -0.00622 -0.0327*** -0.0400***
(0.00727) (0.0107) (0.0137)
Obs 5709 5709 11209
R-sq 0.000 0.246 0.397
Income Supplement 274.5* -960.2*** -1194***
(159.9) (263.1) (379.4)
Obs 5725 5725 11287
R-sq 0.001 0.311 0.450
Years No Yes Yes
Municipalities No Yes Yes
2nd level interactions No No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered on municipal level)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table B1: The main estimation results
Note: OLS estimates for a population of mothers. In the top panel, the dependent
variable is the labour supply dummy of mothers. In the bottom panel, the dependent
variable is earned income of mothers. The supplement is measured in 100 euros per
month. Column (i) is a plain regression of the supplement on the dependent variables.
Column (ii) shows the DD results. Column (iii) presents the triple diﬀerence results. The
third diﬀerence is between whether or not the youngest child is older than 3 years of age.
Individual covariates used: age, education, number of children, the size of household and
indicators for each 3 month intervals of children’s age. Municipal-level covariates used:
municipal income tax rate, municipal unemployment rate, average income in municipal-
ity, average number of places in public child day care relative to the number of children
in municipality.
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(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Supple- 0.0129 0.0149 -2.83e-06 -0.0316***
ment (0.0136) (0.0509) (1.41e-05) (0.0101)
Constant -1.055 -20.46 0.366 9.070**
(5.005) (18.09) (0.266) (4.569)
Obs. 4722 541 217837 5877
R2 0.219 0.548 0.057 0.259
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipalities Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses(clustered on municipal level)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table B2: Robustness checks
Note: The dependent variable in columns (i), (ii) and (iv) is the mother’s labour supply
dummy and in column (iii) it is an indicator with the value of 1 for children under the
age of 3 as a dependent variable . Column (i) is calculated for a population of mothers
whose youngest child is between 3 and 5 years old. They receive a supplement if they
live in a municipality that has the policy. In column (ii) the estimation is performed for
women who will have a child next year and currently do not have a child that is under
3 years old. Column (iii) shows the eﬀect a supplement has on a child ending up in the
treatment group estimated on all households in the sample. Column (iv) shows a similar
estimate to the main results, but with simpliﬁed supplement rules.
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(i)
First -1.006***
stage (.032)
F-value 983.88
Change in -.0000277***
incomes (9.25e-06)
Constant -0.541
(0.397)
Obs. 5879
R2 0.225
Standard errors in parentheses
(clustered on municipal level)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table B4: Change in mothers participation in response to change in incomes
Note: 2SLS results for the mothers’ participation dummy. The ﬁrst stage regresses
municipal supplement on change in incomes associated with entry. The second stage
explains the participation dummy with the ﬁrst-stage predicted value.
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(i) (ii) (iii)
First -1.04*** -1.02*** -1.09***
stage .098 .024 .051
F-value 113 1825 462
Change in -1.69e-05 -1.42e-05 -5.65e-05***
incomes (2.15e-05) (9.74e-06) (2.02e-05)
Obs. 699 3977 1203
R2 0.42 0.21 0.28
Standard errors in parentheses(clustered on municipal level)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table B5: Participation response by mothers education
Note: 2SLS results for the mothers’ participation dummy divided by their education
level. Column (i) shows results with basic education or whom education information was
not available, in column (ii) the highest degree attained is high school or equivalent and
in column (iii) bachelor level or higher. Change in incomes and other monetary values
measured in euros per year.
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2.C Robustness and sensitivity checks
Table C1 reports estimates based on an outcome variable where mothers
have reported working 10 or more months in an interview. Column (iii)
reports a DD estimate equivalent to the main estimates. Although the
coeﬃcient is smaller, it implies a similar participation elasticity, since the
participation elasticity measured in this way is smaller than in normal es-
timates.
(i) (ii) (iii)
Supplement -0.0548*** -0.0843*** -0.0140*
(0.00616) (0.00958) (0.00827)
Years No Yes Yes
Municipalities No Yes Yes
Child age No Yes
Obs. 6023 6023 6023
R2 0.013 0.139 0.273
Standard errors in parentheses(clustered on municipal level)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table C1: Estimations with work dummy based on survey question
Note: OLS estimates for the mothers’ labour supply dummy with a value of 1 when
reported working 10 or more months per year in a survey. Supplement measured in 100
euros per month.
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Outcome Var (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Work Supple- -0.026* -0.034* -0.023 -0.024** -0.029*** -0.02*
ment (0.014) (0.02) (0.015) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012)
Obs. 5709 3572 4493 5273 5709 5709
R2 0.267 0.288 0.262 0.243 0.262 0.234
Income Supple- -979*** -1131*** -866** -687***
ment (339.9) (418.1) (360.8) (227.6)
Obs. 5725 3581 4506 5289
R2 0.322 0.346 0.318 0.308
Standard errors in parentheses(clustered on municipal level)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table C2: Sensitivity checks
Note: OLS estimates for the mothers’ labour supply dummy and earned income. Sup-
plement measured in 100 euros per month. Column (i) includes linear municipal trends
where some smaller municipalities were grouped together. Column (ii) presents estimates
for years from 1995 to 2001. Column (iii) includes years from 1998 to 2005. Column (iv)
leaves out the largest municipality in the sample. Column (v) reports results for labour
supply dummy with a value of 1 when yearly earned income is over 80 per cent of the
mean and column (vi) presents the result of a similar exercise with mothers categorized
as working when they earn over 30 per cent of the annual mean.
60
2.C. Robustness and sensitivity checks
Outcome Coeﬃcient (i) (ii)
Work Supplement 0.0026 0.0043
(0.0093) (0.0095)
Obs. 5527 5527
R2 0.197 0.224
Income Supplement 244 -91
(279) (262)
Obs. 5560 5560
R2 0.366 0.387
Standard errors in parentheses(clustered on municipal level)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table C3: Sensitivity check: results for fathers
Note: OLS estimates for fathers’ labour supply dummy and earned income. Supplement
measured in 100 euros per month. Column (i) is similar to the main DD estimates for
mothers. Column (ii) adds linear municipality trends to this.
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Chapter 3
Public provision of private
goods with optimal income
taxation and extensive margin
Abstract
This paper studies the public provision of private goods. It
presents a model where a government sets taxes optimally and pro-
vides a private good. In contrast to the earlier literature on public
provision of goods, the good provided by the government aﬀects the
extensive margin of labour supply. A ﬁxed cost not visible to the
government arises when an individual participates. The publicly
provided private good aﬀects this ﬁxed cost. I derive an optimal
rule for the provision of the publicly provided private good in this
set-up. The resulting rule links the optimal public provision rule
with its eﬀect on the share of the population in work and the tax
diﬀerential associated with the participation decision. It can be wel-
fare improving to have positive levels of public provision even when
optimal income taxes are used to redistribute income.
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3.1 Introduction
The degree of government-provided public services varies across countries.
Health care, day care for children, care of the elderly and education are
mostly publicly provided in the Nordic countries, while in Anglo-Saxon
countries the system relies more on private markets. When is public pro-
vision at an optimal level? How does the public provision of goods depend
on the tax system? These are questions that this study tries to answer.
This paper studies publicly provided private goods in a setting where
income taxes have been set optimally. Therefore this study is connected to
the Mirrlees tradition. One assumption in the original Mirrlees (1971) model
is that there is only an intensive labour supply margin. The intensive margin
describes the extent to which each individual changes his or her labour
supply. This assumption is not realistic, since it is relatively uncommon to
work a very small amount of hours. Recent optimal income tax literature
has addressed this issue (Saez 2002, Immervoll et al. 2007 and Eissa et al.
2008). Assuming that there is also an extensive labour supply margin can
make it optimal to have negative marginal tax rates. Consequently, the tax
burden on the working poor and at the same time unemployment beneﬁts
can be radically reduced. The signiﬁcance of these results is borne out in
empirical studies that ﬁnd the extensive labour supply elasticity to be larger
than the intensive labour supply elasticity (Eissa and Hoynes 2004, Blundell
2006).
In this paper the publicly provided private good aﬀects the participa-
tion decision. To create a micro-founded reason for the extensive margin,
there is a ﬁxed cost arising from participation. This assumption has been
used in earlier papers studying the extensive margin (Cogan (1981), Im-
mervoll et al. (2007) and Eissa et al. (2008)). The intuition is that to go
to work, one needs to suﬀer or pay some ﬁxed cost that need not be paid
if the participation decision is not made. The ﬁxed cost is not visible to
the government, but the government provision aﬀects the ﬁxed costs and
thereby the number of individuals participating in the labour force. There-
fore, in addition to setting taxes optimally, the government can aﬀect the
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number of taxpayers through the deployment of public expenditure. This
kind of dependence between public provision and participation decisions in
connection with optimal taxes has not been made in earlier public goods
literature1.
However a literature has studied optimal public provision with the inten-
sive margin of labour supply in a setting where income taxes have been set
optimally. Public provision should follow the Samuelson rule if consump-
tion of public good does not convey additional information on individual
ability types (Mirrlees 1976). Such is the case if labour supply and con-
sumption are separable in the individual utility function (Christiansen 1981
and Boadway and Keen 1993). Conversely, if the consumption of public
good does reveal information about the type of the individual, it can be
optimal to provide such a good to a diﬀerent extent than the Samuelson
rule implies. When, for example, public good is complementary to working,
it should be over-provided relative to the Samuelson rule because in this
case public good beneﬁts more those who work more. Then public good
provision makes the distortions created by income taxation less severe.
Since the public provision in this paper is targeted at individuals who de-
cide to participate, the good is private in nature. Publicly provided private
goods have been studied in a number of papers (Blackorby and Donaldson
1988 and Besley and Coate 1991). Although there is no market failure as
with pure public goods, it can be socially optimal for the state to provide
these goods rather than redistribute through taxation. Usually the reason
for this is related to information asymmetry. Blomquist et al. (2010) stud-
ied public provision of private goods in connection with optimal income
taxation. Thus, their article is closely related to this study, although they
did not have extensive labour supply margin in their model.
Including the ingredients of publicly provided private goods and non-
linear income taxes with the extensive margin of labour supply, this paper
provides a rule for optimal government provision of a private good. The
results imply that even if the government uses optimal income taxation to
1Bergstrom and Blomquist (1996) studied the optimality of child care in connection
with the participation decision
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redistribute income as eﬃciently as possible, it can be welfare improving
to provide a private good publicly. This situation occurs when the public
provision decreases the ﬁxed costs of individuals. The limiting case, when
public provision does not aﬀect welfare and thus should be at zero level, is
when it has no eﬀect on the distribution of ﬁxed costs. In all other cases
the provision rule depends on direction in which public provision aﬀects the
distribution of ﬁxed costs. The participation tax diﬀerential ampliﬁes the
eﬀect public provision has on ﬁxed costs.
The assumption that part of the population is excluded from consuming
the good ﬁts the case of the day care of children particularly well. Moreover
the access to good quality day care to an individual clearly aﬀects costs
arising from participation. If access to day care for children is less costly
to parents, it is easier for the parents to work rather than staying at home
taking care of their children. Furthermore, it is entirely conceivable that
the size of the net tax diﬀerential between the taxes when participating and
when not aﬀects the participation decision. The greater is the net diﬀerence
in taxes from participating including the cost of day care, the more extra
provision of day care can aﬀect the participation decisions of parents.
Section 3.2 describes the key assumptions made in the model. It dis-
cusses the use of the ﬁxed cost, individual optimisation problem and the
features of the government objective function. It derives ﬁrst-order con-
ditions and optimal tax rates. Section 3.3 derives the rule for the public
provision of the good in the case of one ability type and discusses the fea-
tures of this simple rule. Section 3.4 adds a continuum of ability types to
the model and presents the rule for publicly provided private goods in this
case. Finally, section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The basic set up
This section presents how participation decisions are analysed with only one
ability type. There is a government that wants to redistribute income using
taxation so that it’s welfare functional is maximised. The welfare functional
comprises individuals’ utility functions, which are given uniform weight for
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simplicity here. The government also provides a good for individuals to
consume. Lump-sum taxes are not available to ﬁnance the public provi-
sion, since the types of individuals are not observable. Therefore non-linear
income taxes are used. To minimise the eﬃciency loss, taxes need to be set
optimally. It is optimal for the government to provide the good if it reduces
the eﬃciency loss from taxation.
There have been various ways of analysing the extensive margin of labour
supply in the literature. Here I use the ﬁxed costs of work - approach. An-
other way to model the participation decision would be to assume that
there are discrete “working places” between which people jump if the tax
incentives change (Saez 2002). This would produce much the same result,
but does not give a micro-founded reason for the existence of discontinu-
ous choice. In a similar way as the ﬁxed cost here, Diamond (1980) uses
work disutility distributed continuously throughout the population. De-
mand side-related reasons for discontinuous working hours are not possible
options in the model analysed here, since the demand side is not properly
modeled.
In the model in this section individuals are heterogeneous in terms of
ﬁxed costs and there is only one ability type. This produces the result that
for a given number of working hours everybody has the same income. Since
the important aspect of the model is that the publicly provided private good
aﬀects the participation decision, the basic mechanisms are revealed with
this simpler model. In section 3.4, a distribution of ability types is added
to the model.
3.2.1 Individuals’ optimisation problem
Individuals consume a private consumption good, c. An individual of type
n receives income y when he or she supplies h hours of labour, so that
y = hn. At this point everybody has the same ability type n. Supplying
labour consumes the individual’s leisure. It is assumed that both leisure
and consumption are normal goods. The utility function of an individual is
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u(c, y, q, g) = v(c, y)− q(g)
u(c, y, q, g) = v(c0, 0)
when participating in work and when not, respectively. q is a ﬁxed cost
and g a publicly provided private good. It is assumed that in the individual
utility function the ﬁxed cost is separable from consumption and labour
supply. This assumption is relevant for the results. From this assumption
it follows that once the participation decision is made, marginal changes
in taxation aﬀect only the working hours decision. Furthermore, it follows
that public provision of the private good targets the participation decision
and does not aﬀect the working hours decision.
I assume there is a continuum of ﬁxed costs that people suﬀer only when
they decide to participate, q 1(y > 0). Individuals ﬁrst pick their draw of q
from the ﬁxed costs distribution and then participate if the ﬁxed cost is not
too high. They can not themselves aﬀect their ﬁxed costs after it is realized.
The ﬁxed costs are distributed on a positive real axis up until some ﬁnite
upper limit R: q ∈ [0, R] with a density function f(q|g) and a cumulative
distribution function F (q|g). The amount of workers is normalised to one,
F (R|g) = 1.
The government can not remove any individuals from society or remove
their ﬁxed costs completely, just increase or decrease them. g only aﬀects
the shape of the distribution f(q|g). I assume that the q is some well deﬁned
monotone function of g : q(g) so that altering g does not change the order
of people with diﬀerent q’s.
Conditional on participating, individuals make their working hours de-
cision by maximising the utility conditional on the budget constraint:
max v(c, y)− q(g)
s.t. c = y − T (y)
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where T (y) is tax on labour income. The following condition emerges
from the FOC for the above problem:
∂u
∂y
∂u
∂c
= 1− T 
which states that the indiﬀerence curves in the (c, y) space should be
tangent to the marginal tax rate. It should be noted that the ﬁxed cost
does not aﬀect the working hours decision. Individuals participate if the
utility from working and suﬀering the ﬁxed costs q(g) is greater than the
utility from not participating. If an individual does not participate, he or
she consumes the transfers that government provides to non-participants,
c0 = −T (0). The condition for participation can be expressed as:
v(c, y)− q(g)≥v(c0, 0) ⇒ q¯ = v(c, y)− v(c0, 0) (3.1)
where q¯ deﬁnes the threshold value for participation, q¯ ∈ (0, R). Using
this threshold value, the number of individuals participating is the cumu-
lative number of those who have a lower ﬁxed cost than q¯, noted F (q¯|g).
Then the amount of non-participants is simply 1−F (q¯|g). For further refer-
ence, using equation (3.1), the following rules can be formulated: ∂v
∂c
= ∂q¯
∂c
,
∂v
∂y
= ∂q¯
∂y
and ∂v
∂c0
= − ∂q¯
∂c0
. These simply state that changes in consumption
and labour supply have an equal eﬀect on the utility and the threshold value
for participation. It is assumed that g does not aﬀect the threshold value
q¯, since the threshold value depends on the v() function which does not de-
pend on q(g). Nevertheless, g aﬀects the distribution of q, thus it aﬀects the
number of participants. On the other hand, the threshold value q¯ is aﬀected
by the tax diﬀerential when participating and when not. In a similar vein,
∂y
∂g
= 0, since g only aﬀects the participation decision through its eﬀect on
the distribution of q, not the hours decision conditional on participating.
3.2.2 Government optimisation
The government wants to redistribute income and at the same time min-
imise the eﬃciency loss from taxation. Its tool is a non-linear income tax
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schedule that depends on income, denoted T (y) for participants and T (0)
for non-participants. It provides a private good, g. The government is as-
sumed to be benevolent and utilitarian. It optimises a welfare functional,
which has individual utility functions as its argument. There is also a bud-
get constraint on objective function of the government. To capture the idea
that utility is maximised for everybody, those outside the labour force are
also within the utility maximisation problem. The general formulation can
be stated as: maxc,y,c0,g W =
´ R
0
u(c, y, g, q)f(q|g)dq s.t. budget holds. This
is formulated into Lagrangian using the equation (3.1) to separate between
participants and non-participants:
maxc,y,c0,gW =
ˆ q¯
0
v(c, y)f(q|g)dq−
ˆ q¯
0
q(g)f(q|g)dq+
ˆ R
q¯
v(c0, 0)f(q|g)dq
+ (
ˆ q¯
0
(y − c)f(q|g)dq −
ˆ R
q¯
c0f(q|g)dq −
ˆ q¯
0
rgf(q|g)dq) (3.2)
The terms that are integrated over the interval (0, q¯) include the par-
ticipants, and the remainder includes the non-participants.   is a Lagrange
multiplier for the government budget constraint. There is no incentive com-
patibility constraint in this problem, since there is only one ability type. In-
stead, the problem of the government is to ensure that all those whose ﬁxed
costs are low enough participate. This is ensured by setting taxes optimally,
since the government does not observe the ﬁxed costs of individuals, only
their distribution.
I take the ﬁrst-order conditions from the government objective (3.2) to
derive rules for optimal taxes:
∂W
∂c0
=
ˆ R
q¯
∂v(c0, 0))
∂c0
f(q|g)dq+ [ ∂q¯
∂c0
f(q¯|g)(y−c+c0−rg)−(1−F (q¯|g))] = 0
(3.3)
∂W
∂c
=
ˆ q¯
0
∂v(c, y))
∂c
f(q|g)dq+ [∂q¯
∂c
f(q¯|g)(y−c+c0−rg)−F (q¯|g)] = 0 (3.4)
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∂W
∂y
=
ˆ q¯
0
∂v(c, y))
∂y
f(q|g)dq +  [∂q¯
∂y
f(q¯|g)(y − c+ c0 − rg) + F (q¯|g)] = 0
(3.5)
The government welfare functional, the ﬁrst line in the equation (3.2),
contains the individual utilities. Changes in consumption and income af-
fect this part directly. The indirect eﬀects come through the budget. I use
Leibniz’s rule in these derivations because the integral limit q¯ depends on
consumption and income. Further derivation steps are given in the Ap-
pendix 3.A.
3.2.3 Optimal taxes
Since there is only one ability type, conditional on participating, everybody
has similar marginal utilities, as seen in the individual’s maximisation prob-
lem. The government sets taxes so that the one ability type chooses hours
optimally, conditional on participating.
From equations (3.4) and (3.5), I write the following rule:
´ q¯
0
∂v(c,y)
∂y
f(q|g)dq´ q¯
0
∂v(c,y)
∂c
f(q|g)dq =
∂v(c,y)
∂y
F (q¯|g)
∂v(c,y)
∂c
F (q¯|g) =
 [ ∂q¯
∂y
f(q¯|g)(y − c+ c0 − rg) + F (q¯|g)]
 [∂q¯
∂c
f(q¯|g)(y − c+ c0 − rg)− F (q¯|g)]
The ﬁrst equality follows from the fact that since the social welfare
functional is already at optimum, the second-order eﬀects do not aﬀect its
value. Thus the integral limit is not aﬀected by changes in incomes and
consumption in the welfare functional, and the terms ∂v
∂c
and ∂v
∂y
can be
taken out of the integral. The integral limit is aﬀected in the government
budget constraint, which is not already at optimum. Then I can write:
∂v(c,y)
∂y
∂v(c,y)
∂c
=
[ ∂q¯
∂y
f(q¯|g)
F (q¯|g)(y − c+ c0 − rg) + 1]
[∂q¯
∂c
f(q¯|g)
F (q¯|g)(y − c+ c0 − rg)− 1]
⇒
∂v(c,y)
∂y
∂v(c,y)
∂c
[
∂q¯
∂c
f(q¯|g)
F (q¯|g)(y− c+ c0 − rg)− 1] = [
∂q¯
∂y
f(q¯|g)
F (q¯|g)(y− c+ c0 − rg) + 1]
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⇒
∂v(c,y)
∂y
∂v(c,y)
∂c
=
∂v(c,y)
∂y
∂v(c,y)
∂c
∂q¯
∂c
f(q¯|g)
F (q¯|g)(y−c+c0−rg)−
∂q¯
∂y
f(q¯|g)
F (q¯|g)(y−c+c0−rg)−1
⇒
∂v(c,y)
∂y
∂v(c,y)
∂c
=
∂v(c, y)
∂y
f(q¯|g)
F (q¯|g)(y−c+c0−rg)−
∂v(c, y)
∂y
f(q¯|g)
F (q¯|g)(y−c+c0−rg)−1
⇒
∂v(c,y)
∂y
∂v(c,y)
∂c
= −1
This last line follows from the deﬁnition of q¯, according to which ∂v
∂c
=
∂q¯
∂c
, ∂v
∂y
= ∂q¯
∂y
as noted above. The marginal tax rate is:
MTR =
vy
vc
+ 1 = 0 (3.6)
The resulting rule states that the marginal tax rate for the participating
worker is zero. There is nothing surprising about this result. Since the ﬁxed
cost from participating is separable from labour supply and consumption
in the individual utility function, there is no reason to distort the hours
decision after the individual has made the decision to participate. Moreover,
even with two ability type settings it is normal to have the result that the
highest ability type has zero marginal tax rates (Stiglitz 1982).
Another question is how the tax diﬀerential for participants and non-
participants should be set optimally. Marginal tax rates are not meaningful,
because the decision to participate is not continuous. Instead, I derive a
rule for the participation tax rate deﬁned as the diﬀerence between T (y)
(taxes faced by workers) and T (0) = −c0 (subsidies government gives to
non-participants) divided by the consumption diﬀerence in these two states
as in Saez (2002). In this case the participation tax rate is aﬀected by the
public provision of a private good multiplied by its production cost, rg.
From equation (3.3):
∂v(c0, 0))
∂c0
(1− F (q¯|g)) +  [ ∂q¯
∂c0
f(q¯|g)(y − c+ c0 − rg)− (1− F (q¯|g))] = 0
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⇒ λ ∂q¯
∂c0
f(q¯|g)(y − c+ c0 − rg) =
(
−∂v(c0, 0))
∂c0
+ λ
)
(1− F (q¯|g))
⇒ (y − c+ c0 − rg) =
(
−∂v(c0, 0))
∂c0
+ λ
)
(1− F (q¯|g))
λ ∂q¯
∂c0
f(q¯|g)
⇒ T (y)− T (0)− rg
(c− c0) =
(
∂q¯
∂c0
+ λ
)
1− F (q¯|g)
λ ∂q¯
∂c0
f(q¯|g)(c− c0)
⇒ T (y)− T (0)− rg
(c− c0) =
(
∂q¯
∂c0
1
λ
+ 1
)
1
 
where   = ∂(1−F (q¯|g))
∂c0
(c−c0)
1−F (q¯|g) = − ∂q¯∂c0f(q¯|g) c−c01−F (q¯|g) is the participation
elasticity. This rule states that the size of the optimal participation tax rate
depends inversely on the absolute value of the participation elasticity, which
is similar to Saez (2002) and Eissa et al. (2008). The optimal participation
tax rate also depends on how the beneﬁts for non-participants aﬀect the
threshold value for participation and the shadow price of the government
budget, λ. Both the participation elasticity and the change in q¯ are negative
numbers. It is proved in the Appendix 3.B that the T (y)− T (0)− rg term
is positive in the optimal allocation. Therefore the participation tax rate is
positive as long as the consumption of participants is higher than that of
non-participants. The larger the participation elasticity is as an absolute
value, the smaller the participation tax rate becomes. It is also proved in
the Appendix 3.B that c0 is positive when taxes are set optimally. Thus
the government is providing subsidies to non-participants.
In solving the optimisation problem, the public provision of g is ﬁrst
kept constant and the government sets taxes optimally. Nevertheless, the
amount of public provision g evaluated at its cost r aﬀects the participation
tax rate. This is natural, since the public provision is targeted only at the
participating share of the population. Thus the public provision aﬀects the
net tax diﬀerential when working and when not. Large values of rg could
oﬀset an otherwise large diﬀerence between the tax rates T (y)− T (0).
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3.3 Public provision of private goods
Let us now consider the public provision of private goods. The aim is to
develop a welfare maximising rule for optimal government provision. The
interesting part is to look at what kind of impact unobserved ﬁxed costs
have on the government provision rule. If public provision does not have
any eﬀect on participation behaviour through ﬁxed costs, the government
could still provide the good. In that case it might not be welfare improving
to do so. The government redistributes through optimal income taxation.
The question is whether public provision can increase social welfare even if
the taxes have been set optimally.
The aim is to derive a rule where the sum of marginal rates of substi-
tution between public and private goods is equated to the rate of transfor-
mation to produce the publicly provided private good. In this model the
good g only aﬀects the ﬁxed cost distribution f(q|g), while consumption c
aﬀects the v(c, y) part of the individual’s utility function. Moreover, non-
participants do not suﬀer the ﬁxed cost and therefore they do not beneﬁt
from government provision. If the public provision of g does not aﬀect the
ﬁxed costs of individuals in any way, the derivative of g with respect to q
and its distribution are zero :∂q(g)
∂g
= 0 ⇒ ∂f(q|g)
∂g
= 0
I assume here that the government has set taxes optimally. To derive a
rule for optimal provision of g, I take the FOC for g from the government
objective function (3.2):
∂W
∂g
=
ˆ q¯
0
v(c, y)
∂f(q|g)
∂g
dq −
ˆ q¯
0
(
q(g)
∂f(q|g)
∂g
+
∂q(g)
∂g
f(q|g)
)
dq
+
ˆ R
q¯
v(c0, 0)
∂f(q|g)
∂g
dq
+  
(ˆ q¯
0
∂y
∂g
f(q|g)dq +
ˆ q¯
0
(y − c)∂f(q|g)
∂g
dq−
)
+  
(ˆ R
q¯
c0
∂f(q|g)
∂g
dq −
ˆ q¯
0
(
∂rg
∂g
f(q|g) + rg∂f(q|g)
∂g
)
dq
)
= 0 (3.7)
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This equation is modiﬁed to obtain a simpler rule for the optimal pro-
vision of g:
ˆ q¯
0
−∂q(g)
∂g
f(q|g))dq+
ˆ q¯
0
(v(c, y)− q(g))∂f(q|g)
∂g
dq+
ˆ R
q¯
v(c0, 0)
∂f(q|g)
∂g
dq
= − (
ˆ q¯
0
(y− c)∂f(q|g)
∂g
dq−
ˆ R
q¯
c0
∂f(q|g)
∂g
dq−
ˆ q¯
0
rg
∂f(q|g)
∂g
dq− rF (q¯|g))
⇒
ˆ q¯
0
−∂q(g)
∂g
∂v(c,y)
∂c
∂v(c, y)
∂c
f(q|g))dq = − ((y − c+ c0 − rg)∂F (q¯|g)
∂g
− rF (q¯|g))
In the last equation the ﬁrst two distribution eﬀects (∂f(q|g)
∂g
) were en-
veloped out, since the government welfare functional was already at opti-
mum. The distribution eﬀects work through the government budget, how-
ever. Also, ∂y
∂g
= 0 because in this simple case g is separable from y in
the individual utility function. Below I use the government welfare weights
which are   = ∂v
∂c
f(q|g)/ for workers. The rule for providing g then be-
comes:
ˆ q¯
0
MRSgc dq = rF (q¯|g)− (T (y)− T (0)− rg)∂F (q¯|g)
∂g
The MRSgc term describes the marginal valuation of g compared to
c for each participant. It is weighted by the government welfare weights.
It is imminent from the derivations of the above rule that if g does not
have any eﬀect on the ﬁxed costs, then the optimal public provision level
is zero. On the other hand, if public provision has eﬀect on the ﬁxed
costs, the marginal rate of substitution is equated with marginal rate of
transformation (rF (q¯|g)) and the distribution eﬀect
(
∂F (q¯|g)
∂g
)
multiplied
by the size of the participation tax diﬀerential (T (y) − T (0) − rg). If the
public provision produces negative MRSgc it is not welfare improving and
should not be carried out. This is because if in the above rule MRSgc is
negative, ∂q(g)
∂g
> 0 ⇒ ∂F (q¯|g)
∂g
> 0. This means that there are no beneﬁts
from providing g in terms of welfare or distributional gains.
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The signiﬁcance of the additional terms to the MRT on the right hand
side is that if they are negative (positive), g should be over-provided (under-
provided) relative to the simple rule where MRSgc is equated with MRT. If
the government provision of g shifts the weight of the ﬁxed cost distribution
towards workers (and at the same time away from non participants), the
distribution eﬀect is positive and the total eﬀect is negative. Increasing
government provision shifts the distribution towards workers if it decreases
the ﬁxed costs. The tax diﬀerential is always positive, which is proved in
the Appendix (3.B). The role of the participation tax rate is to amplify
the distribution eﬀect; the greater the net income diﬀerential is between
participation and non-participation, the more it ampliﬁes the eﬀect through
changes in distribution.
A real-world example that ﬁts this theoretical model best is the day
care of children. It is sometimes provided by the government, although in
nature it is a private good. When public provision makes day care more
accessible, participation becomes easier for parents. Thus public provision
of day care lowers the ﬁxed cost for participation. The added provision
shifts the ﬁxed costs for a small number of parents below the threshold
value q¯ and consequently they ﬁnd it optimal to participate. This eﬀect
is ampliﬁed if the existing participation tax diﬀerential is at a high level.
In the tax diﬀerential the level of public provision aﬀects the participation
tax rate. If the provision of day care is already at a high level, increasing
government provision even further does not have as great an impact on the
provision rule as when existing provision is at a lower level.
3.4 Adding a distribution of ability types
From here on I assume that for each ﬁxed cost there is a distribution of
ability types. This assumption makes the heterogeneity of the population
two-dimensional. The idea here is that some individuals are more able to
produce and some more eager to participate. The two characteristics do
not depend on each other. In this setting it is possible that an individual of
a higher ability type (who is productive) does not participate because the
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ﬁxed cost of participation is too high for that individual. I ﬁrst set up the
individual optimisation problem, then the government problem and then
study the optimal public provision of goods.
The individual utility function can now be written:
u(c, y, g, q, n) = v(c, y, n)− q(g)
Thus the ﬁxed cost q is separable from the ability type n. If an individual
does not participate the utility function is written:
u(c, y, g, q, n) = v(c, 0, n)
Conditional on participating, an individual chooses working hours ac-
cording to the utility maximization problem:
max u(c, y, g, q, n)
s.t. cn = yn − T (yn)
where cn and yn denote the consumption and labour income of type n,
respectively. It is additionally assumed that given q the only diﬀerence in
preferences is that more productive individuals earn more with the same
number of working hours: y = hn. The government only sees total income
y, not h or n separately.
At the participation limit, the utility from participating and not partic-
ipating must be equal:
v(c, y, n)− q(g) = v(c, 0, n)
⇒ q¯n = v(c, y, n)− v(c, 0, n) (3.8)
where q¯n deﬁnes the threshold value for participation of type n.
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3.4.1 Government optimisation
The government aims to maximise the welfare functional where the argu-
ments are the individual utility functions. There is a budget constraint
which balances the revenue collected in taxes and the expenditure on the
government provision of g.
Now an incentive compatibility constraint needs to be introduced into
the model. This is to cope with the possibility that more able workers
pretend to be less able if the tax incentives are not set correctly. This
kind of problem with an ability type distribution was ﬁrst introduced by
Mirrlees (1971) and followed by a sizeable literature. Although there is
another dimension of heterogeneity in the present model - ﬁxed costs - the
incentive compatibility constraint can be formulated in a normal way. I
demonstrate how the ﬁxed cost does not aﬀect the derivation of the normal
incentive compatibility constraint in the Appendix 3.C. The intuition is
simply that since the ﬁxed cost q and the ability type n are separable in
the individual utility function, the ﬁxed cost does not aﬀect the choice of
working hours, which depends on ability type.
For later purposes I denote dv
dn
= γ. This is the incentive compatibility
constraint used in the derivations below. It requires that the ﬁrst-order con-
dition for the utility with respect to ability type is zero. If this condition is
fulﬁlled, type n chooses the allocation intended for type n. Before inserting
this into the government objective function, it is integrated by parts.
The government objective is integrated over the distribution of ability
types. For each ability type, it is separated between participants and non-
participants using equation (3.8), as was done in the one ability type case.
Now that there is a continuum of ﬁxed costs for each ability type, I write the
ﬁxed cost distribution conditional on ability type, f(q|n, g). Then there is
a diﬀerent share of participants for each ability type, denoted by the cumu-
lative distribution function F (q¯|n, g). Additionally, there is a distribution
for the ability types denoted h(n).
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The Lagrangian for this problem is formulated as follows:
maxc,y,c0,gW =
n¯ˆ
n
(ˆ q¯n
0
v(c, y, n)f(q|n, g)dq −
ˆ q¯n
0
q(g)f(q|n, g)dq
)
h(n)dn (3.9)
+
n¯ˆ
n
(ˆ R
q¯n
v(c0, 0, n)f(q|n, g)dq
)
h(n)dn
+  
n¯ˆ
n
(ˆ q¯n
0
(y − c)f(q|n, g)dq −
ˆ R
q¯n
c0f(q|n, g)dq
)
h(n)dn
−  
n¯ˆ
n
(ˆ q¯n
0
rgf(q|n, g)dq
)
h(n)dn
−
n¯ˆ
n
(α′v + αγ)dn+ α(n)v(n) + α(n¯)v(n¯) (3.10)
The last two terms are the transversality constraints. For them to work
without problems, I need to assume that the distribution of ability types
covers all the ﬁxed cost types. The incentive compatibility constraint needs
to work for each n. There is no need to integrate it over the ﬁxed cost
distribution, since ﬁxed costs do not aﬀect the working hours decision.
The tax properties are derived in earlier literature (Saez 2002, Immervol
et al. 2007 and Jacquet, Lehmann and Van der Linden 2010), so I do
not derive them here. The general properties of the optimal tax rates are
that there is a non-linear tax schedule for participants. For each ability
type there is diﬀerent participation rate. Depending on the size of the
extensive and intensive labour supply elasticities, the tax schedule may
incorporate negative marginal tax rates. The higher the extensive labour
supply elasticity in lower income groups, the more likely the tax schedule
is to have in-work beneﬁts for the working poor.
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3.4.2 Publicly provided private goods with many
ability types
Here I derive the provision rule for gn in the case of many ability types. I
take the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to the publicly provided private
good, gn, for each n separately.
dWn
dgn
=
(ˆ q¯n
0
v(c, y, n)
∂f(q|n, g)
∂g
dq
)
h(n)
−
(ˆ q¯n
0
(
q(g)
∂f(q|n, g)
∂g
+
∂q(g)
∂g
f(q|n, g)
)
dq
)
h(n)
+
(ˆ R
q¯n
v(c0, 0, n)
∂f(q|n, g)
∂g
dq
)
h(n)
+ λ(
ˆ q¯n
0
(yn − cn)∂f(q|n, g)
∂g
dq −
ˆ R
q¯n
c0
∂f(q|n, g)
∂g
dq
−
ˆ q¯n
0
(
∂rg
∂g
f(q|n, g) + rg∂f(q|n, g)
∂g
)
dq)h(n) = 0
where yn and cn indicate the income and consumption of type n. This
ﬁrst-order condition is very similar to that in the one ability type model.
The only diﬀerence is that since this is taken separately for each n, the
conditional density f(q|n, g), the publicly provided good, labour income
and consumption are all functions of n. Thus there is a speciﬁc provision
level for participants of each ability type.
The above FOC can be derived into a simpler form as follows:
ˆ q¯n
0
−∂q(g)
∂g
f(q|n, g))dqh(n) =
−λ
(ˆ q¯n
0
(yn − cn)∂f(q|n, g)
∂g
dq −
ˆ R
q¯n
c0
∂f(q|n, g)
∂g
dq
)
h(n)
−λ
(
−
ˆ q¯n
0
rg
∂f(q|n, g)
∂g
dq − rF (q¯|n, g)
)
h(n)
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⇒
ˆ q¯n
0
−∂q(g)
∂g
∂v(c,y,n)
∂cn
ωndq = rF (q¯|n, g)− (yn − cn + c0 − rgn)∂F (q¯|n, g)
∂g
where ωn =
∂vn
∂cn
f(q¯|n, g)/λ is the welfare weight that the government
puts on a worker of type n. The term describing the eﬀect of providing gn on
the distribution of workers coming from the government welfare functional
is again enveloped out. This equation can be written as follows:
ˆ q¯n
0
MRSgcωndq = rF (q¯|n, g)− (Tn(yn)− T (0)− rgn)∂F (q¯|n, g)
∂g
(3.11)
where Tn(yn) is taxes paid by a participating worker of type n. This
is the optimal provision rule for a publicly provided private good of type
n. It states that the public provision of gn is welfare improving, as long
as it has a positive eﬀect on welfare in terms of MRSgc for type n. The
more the provision of gn increases the number of participants of type n,
the more welfare improving it is. There should be no government provision
of goods in the opposite case. The greater the tax diﬀerential is between
participation and non-participation, the greater the impact of the whole
additional term is to the provision rule.
The optimal provision rule depends on the ability type, in this case
through the participation rate and the government welfare weights. Also,
the size of the additional terms depends on the ability type. Since this
rule holds for every n, the eﬀect is diﬀerent for diﬀerent ability types. The
responsiveness of the participation rate to changes in government provision(
∂F (q¯|n,g)
∂g
)
depends on the shape of the cumulative distribution function.
With bell-shaped distributions, if the participation rate is already close to
it’s maximum, it is diﬃcult to increase it even further. Across diﬀerent
ability types, it is possible that high n types participate more than low n
types. In that case, high ability types would have a smaller additional term
in the absolute value than lower ability types.
The interaction with the participation tax diﬀerential adds interesting
interaction to the rule. The greater the participation tax diﬀerential for
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a given income group, the greater impact it has on additional terms for
that group. For example, the participation tax diﬀerential could be smaller
for lower income groups than for higher income groups. The pre-existing
provision level of gn aﬀects the tax diﬀerential. Even if the participation tax
diﬀerential is high without public provision, large values of rgn can oﬀset
this.
The leading real-world application for this model is publicly provided
day-care for children. The general reasons for this were explained in the
one ability type case. The added implications of many ability types ﬁts the
example of child care as well. The greater eﬀect public provision of child
care has on an income group, the more it should greater welfare eﬀect it has
on an income group. For example parents on low incomes could be more
responsive to the added provision of child care. They could ﬁnd that a
signiﬁcant share of their ﬁxed cost of participation is removed by the extra
provision of day care. This eﬀect is stronger, the higher the participation tax
diﬀerential is for this group. These eﬀects could be lower for higher-income
groups if they gain more from participation in any case.
3.5 Conclusion
This study has investigated a government provision rule for a private good in
a setting where the good aﬀects the extensive margin of labour supply. The
good is connected to the extensive margin through it’s eﬀect on a ﬁxed cost
arising from participation. First, the optimal tax and the public provision
rule are formulated in a simple case where there is heterogeneity only in
the ﬁxed costs. The optimal marginal tax rate for those participating is
zero. A participation tax rate aﬀecting the participation decision depends
inversely on the participation elasticity. The rule for government provision
of the private good states that a good that increases the participation in
the labour force is welfare improving to provide publicly even if the income
taxes have been set optimally. The size of the participation tax diﬀerential
ampliﬁes this eﬀect.
Second, a more general model incorporated another source of hetero-
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geneity: ability types. The public provision rule in this case is similar to
the simple case of just one ability type. The diﬀerence is that there is a
separate rule for each ability type. The government provision rule depends
on ability types through the distribution eﬀects and the participation tax
diﬀerentials that vary across ability types. With these statistics available,
the rule provides a clear intuition about cases in which public provision
should be extended and those in which it should not. The deﬁning factors
in the rule are the direction in which participation changes and the extent
of the net income diﬀerential between participation and non-participation.
The earlier literature studying government provision of goods in connec-
tion with optimal taxes has not taken the extensive margin of labour sup-
ply into account. Thus the results of Mirrlees (1976), Christiansen (1981),
Boadway and Keen (1993) and Boadway et al. (1998) state that public
projects should diﬀer from the simple cost-beneﬁt analysis only if they con-
vey some information on the productivity of individuals. This does not
occur if consumption and leisure are weakly separable in the individual
utility function. The model studied in this paper diﬀers from this result.
Indeed, even if consumption and leisure are separable, there could be rea-
sons to publicly provide private goods. If the good that is provided by the
government lowers the ﬁxed cost of participation, it could be welfare im-
proving to provide it even if redistribution is taken care of optimal income
taxes.
Another line of earlier research has studied the implications of welfare
reforms with the extensive margin of labour supply taken into consideration
(Saez 2002, Immervoll et al. 2007 and Eissa et al. 2008). The extensive
margin has an impact on the optimal tax and transfer schedule. While
the present study does not attempt to simulate the tax schedule for wel-
fare reform purposes, the results have some signiﬁcance here. It is shown
that public provision of goods aﬀects the government revenue requirement.
Empirically, government expenditure on education, child care, health care
and other services can be sizeable. The results here show that this kind of
provision should be taken into account when considering welfare reforms, if
the provision aﬀects the participation decisions of individuals.
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3.A Appendix Derivation of FOC
The derivation of the ﬁrst-order conditions (3.3)-(3.5) from the government
objective function (3.2) is shown. The objective function consists of the
utility part and the budget part. Since the individual utility is already at
an optimum, marginally changing consumption has only a direct eﬀect on
individual utility. From the budget part I need to take the indirect eﬀects
to private consumption into account as well. I need to use Leibniz’s rule
when deriving an integral where the limit depends on the derivative. In
this case q¯ depends on consumption and income. This can be seen from
equation (3.1). I take the derivative ∂W
∂c0
in equation (3.3) as an example
of how the remainder of the derivations are performed. First there is the
partial derivation of the inner function of the integral term in the objective
function,
ˆ R
q¯
∂v(c0, 0))
∂c0
f(q|g)dq
The limit is enveloped out, since in the objective function individual
utility is already at optimum and the derivation only directly aﬀects the
utility for this part. The same does not hold for the government budget,
since there is no utility function that is already optimised, just the amount
of taxes and transfers paid by everybody and the government provision of
g. The derivation of the budget becomes:
 
∂
∂c0
(
ˆ q¯
0
(y − c)f(q|g)dq −
ˆ R
q¯
c0f(q|g)dq −
ˆ q¯
0
rgf(q|g)dq)
⇐⇒  
(ˆ q¯
0
∂
∂c0
(y − c)f(q|g)dqf(q|g)dq + ∂q¯
∂c0
(y − c)f(q¯|g)
)
+ 
(
+
ˆ R
q¯
∂
∂c0
c0f(q|g)dq − ∂q¯
∂c0
c0f(q¯|g)
)
+λ
(
−
ˆ q¯
0
∂
∂c0
rgf(q|g)dqf(q|g)dq − ∂q¯
∂c0
rgf(q¯|g)
)
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The ﬁrst and third integrals above are zero and in the second integral
the density function is not aﬀected by the changes in c0. Only the threshold
value q¯ is aﬀected. The above expression then simpliﬁes to
 
[
∂q¯
∂c0
(y − c− rg)f(q¯|g) + (1− F (q¯|g))− ∂q¯
∂c0
c0f(q¯|g)
]
which gives the ﬁrst order condition (3.3) after combining with the direct
eﬀect from the utility part.
3.B Appendix The Sign of Taxes on
Non-participants
I prove here the sign of certain terms in the optimum allocation. The FOC
of 3.2 with respect to λ, the Lagrange multiplier for the government budget
constraint, is:
c {0}
∂W
∂λ
= (y − c)F (q¯|g)− c0(1− F (q¯|g))− rgF (q¯|g) = 0
⇒ (y − c+ c0 − rg)F (q¯|g)− c0 = 0
From here on, I denote the terms (y− c+ c0 − rg) ≡ A, f(q¯|g) ≡ f¯ and
F (q¯|g) ≡ F¯ . The term A is part of the participation tax rate and is also
in the rule for optimal public provision of g. Then using FOC for c0 and y
from the government objective function it follows:
−∂v
∂y
F¯
∂q¯
∂y
f¯A+ F¯
=
− ∂v
∂c0
(1− F¯ )
∂q¯
∂y
f¯A− (1− F¯ )
⇒ −∂v
∂y
F¯
(
∂q¯
∂c0
f¯A− (1− F¯ )
)
= − ∂v
∂c0
(1− F¯ )
(
∂q¯
∂y
f¯A− F¯
)
⇒ ∂v
∂c
∂v
∂y
f¯A =
(
∂v
∂y
− ∂v
∂c0
)
F¯ (1− F¯ )
where the last line follows from ∂q¯
∂c0
= − ∂v
∂c0
and ∂q¯
∂y
= ∂v
∂y
as noted when
the participation threshold was deﬁned in equation (3.1). The last equality
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proves that A is positive, since consumption and leisure are normal goods
and the distribution terms are positive by deﬁnition. Using the sign of A
again proves that c0is positive from the following equation:
AF¯ = c0
which was modiﬁed from the FOC for λ from the Lagrangian (3.2).
3.C Appendix Incentive Compatibility
Constraint
I ﬁrst write the indirect utility function of type n individual as e(n). Then
a given allocation is incentive compatible if everyone of type n receives the
greatest utility from choosing an allocation intended for type n:
e(n)− v(c, y, n)− q(g) = 0 ≤ e(n′)− v(c, y, n′)− q(g) (3.12)
where n′ refers to some ability type diﬀerent from n. This equation
takes the diﬀerence between the indirect utility and the direct utility. The
equation reﬂects the fact that this diﬀerence should be minimised when
acting according to one’s own type. Choosing the allocation intended for
any other type n′ means that the utility achieved is smaller than when
choosing an allocation intended for one’s own type.
It can be seen already from this that the ﬁxed cost drops out from this
expression, since it separable from the rest of the utility function. From here
on, it is possible to follow a normal derivation of the incentive compatibility
constraint. I totally diﬀerentiate the expression in equation (3.12) to get:
de
dn
− ∂v
∂c
dc
dn
− ∂v
∂y
dy
dn
− ∂v
∂n
= 0
⇒ −∂v
∂c
dc
dn
− ∂v
∂y
dy
dn
= 0
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From here it is obvious that the ﬁxed cost does not aﬀect the marginal
utility with respect to productivity. The intuition here is that people par-
ticipate when the utility from participation is greater than the utility from
not participating. Ability type aﬀects this diﬀerence only as regards the
participation part. Thus if the allocation is incentive-compatible so that
everyone chooses according to their own type, they also participate if their
ﬁxed cost is low enough to do that. For this reason participation is aﬀected
through average taxes and the hours decision through marginal tax rates.
dv
dc
dc
dn
+
dv
dh
dh
dn
= 0
dv
dc
dc
dy
+
dv
dh
dh
dy
= 0
vh
n
dcdy
dndc
+
vh
n
dvdc
dcdy
dh
dn
= 0 ⇒ dv
dn
= −vhh
n
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Chapter 4
What was actually cut in the
barbers’ VAT cut?
1
Abstract
The tax incidence of consumption taxes across various sectors of
the economy is a key aspect when designing a tax structure. How-
ever, there are very few empirical ﬁndings on this subject. This paper
studies the tax incidence of consumption taxes utilising a VAT re-
form targeted at labour-intensive services in Finland. The reform
creates a natural experiment set-up, because the reduced VAT was
targeted at hairdressers, whereas the normal tax treatment still ap-
plied to beauty salons. This experiment is exogenous to the economic
conditions of hairdressers in Finland, since this group was selected in
a European Commission Directive. I study the eﬀects of the reform
on prices and demand. The results suggest that barbers cut their
prices only by half of what complete pass-through would have im-
plied. Using the experiment as an instrument, I ﬁnd little eﬀect on
demand for the services. There does not seem to be any indication
of a signiﬁcant eﬀect on labour demand either.
1Acknowledgments: The ﬁnancial support of the Nordic Tax Research Council for
this study and the cooperation with the Finnish hairdressers’ association and the Con-
sumer agency to get the data for this study are gratefully acknowledged.
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4.1 Introduction
Consumption taxes are signiﬁcant sources of tax revenue for governments.
An important question in designing consumption taxes optimally is whether
they should be uniform, or diﬀer across commodities. According to eco-
nomic theory they should diﬀer when they have a diﬀering impact on the
level demanded (Ramsey 1927)2. A good that has inelastic demand and
small cross-elasticity with other goods should face a higher tax rate. The
eﬃciency-related reason for this is that when there is little eﬀect on the
demand for a good from increasing the tax, there is little distortion to con-
sumption of that good. In the opposite case of highly sensitive demand even
a small increase in tax distorts the equilibrium behaviour. Consequently,
to set consumption taxes optimally across commodities, the demand elas-
ticities of each good should be known. Also employment in a given sector
is aﬀected by the changes in demand for the product it produces.
This study estimates empirically how taxes shift to prices and their ef-
fect on demand for the services. I utilise a tax reform in Finland introducing
lower value added tax (VAT) rates for hairdressers. The reduced VAT is ex-
ogenous to the economic circumstances of hairdressers, since this group was
selected in an European Commission Directive long before the experiment
was implemented in Finland. There are natural control groups for hair-
dressers: beauty salons, day spas and masseurs. These are labour-intensive
services like hairdressers, but do not beneﬁt from the reduced VAT regime
in Finland.
The results indicate that hairdressers cut their prices by half of what full
pass-through would have implied. Turnover evaluated at consumer prices
follows the direction of change in consumer prices, but not to the same
extent. Finally, using the reform as an instrument for price changes does
not result in a signiﬁcant eﬀect on demand due to the tax decrease. Any
eﬀect on employment in these services has to go through changes in demand
2Another school of thought claims that consumption taxes should not be uniform if
diﬀerent goods are complementary with leisure to a diﬀerent extent (Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1976) and Saez (2002)) or because of the equity reasons (Diamond and Mirrlees (1971)).
Here the focus is on eﬃciency reasons which also need to be taken into consideration.
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for the services, suggesting that in this case there is no eﬀect on labour
demand. I estimate similar regressions on the monthly wage sums paid by
hairdressers as on demand. The results conﬁrm the intuition that there is
no eﬀect on labour demand.
This study contributes to the literature studying the tax incidence of
consumption taxes on prices. Doyle and Samphantharak (2008) study tax
incidence on gasoline prices. They have a credible method for determining
the eﬀect of taxes from regional temporary tax repeals in certain regions
of the USA. They ﬁnd a 70 to 100 per cent pass-through on prices. The
results are not directly comparable with this study due to the diﬀerent prod-
uct (gasoline) they study. Other studies (Poterba (1996), Besley and Rosen
(1999) and Alm, Sennoga and Skidmore (2009)) focus on the tax incidence
of the sales taxes of various products. These studies provide valuable infor-
mation in a very understudied subject, although it is possible that the tax
reforms they study are not completely exogenous to price changes.
The reduced VAT experiment in Finland oﬀers several advantages in
studying the tax incidence of VAT. First, since the reform is exogenous to
the behaviour of ﬁrms, it is possible to use a natural experiment set-up in
analysing the eﬀects. The outcomes of the treatment and control groups
can be compared before and after the change in the VAT regime. Figure A2
illustrates the main approach. It is evident that the assumptions needed for
the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences to be identiﬁed work in this case. Second, the
data contains both turnover and prices for a sample of ﬁrms. Consequently,
it is possible to establish the eﬀect of the VAT on the demand for labour-
intensive services using a credible natural experiment approach.
Section 4.2 describes the institutional background and discusses the an-
ticipated eﬀect of lowering VAT. Section 4.3 presents the approach used
to analyse the eﬀects of the reform. The data is presented in section 4.4.
Section 4.5 presents and explains the results and section 3.5 concludes the
study.
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4.2 Design of the reform and anticipated
eﬀects
4.2.1 Institutional background
The European Union requires Member States to have a consumption tax
system based on value added taxes (VAT). A certain degree of harmonisa-
tion is required of individual Member States in setting their VAT rates (EC
2006a). As an exception to their normal VAT rates, Member States are
allowed to experiment with reduced VAT rates for certain labour-intensive
services. The aim is to allow Member States to study the incidence on
prices and employment as well as the eﬀects on the shadow economy (EC
1999 and 2006b).
Finland joined the second round of the reduced VAT rate experiment.
The VAT rate was lowered from 22 per cent to 8 per cent from the beginning
of 2007 and the reduced rate is to remain in force until the end of 2010
(Finlex 2006). The original European Commission (EC 1999) Directive
listed the services that are eligible for reduced VAT rates. This list includes
some labour-intensive services, but leaves out others (such as beauty salons).
The services selected by Finland from the EC list were hairdressers and
small businesses that provide services such as repairing bicycles, shoes and
leather goods and clothing and household linen.3
Since the lowered VAT rate was implemented according to the EC Di-
rective, it is unlikely to have been driven by the speciﬁc economic circum-
stances of these services. This study concentrates on hairdressers, because
there is a control group for them: beauty salons, day spas and masseurs.
This control group resembles hairdressers in that it is labour-intensive, but
the businesses do not beneﬁt from lower VAT rates since they are not cov-
ered by the EC Directive. There is no mention in (EC 1999 or 2006b)
why hairdressers were speciﬁcally identiﬁed as being appropriate for a VAT
3In Finland, household services also beneﬁt from special tax treatments, but this was
implemented under a diﬀerent proposal starting from 1997 (Finlex 1997). Since then the
tax reduction has been gradually increased.
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experiment, whilst the businesses in the control group in this study were
excluded. The reasons given for selecting the target groups were on a more
general level, such as “high anticipated eﬀect on increasing employment”.
In Finland consumer prices announced in price tags include VAT. For
this reason, it is possible that if ﬁrms do not reduce the consumer price in
response to reduced VAT, consumers will not necessarily notice that any-
thing has changed since the consumer price remains unchanged. Thus if
consumers do not know of the experiment, they would not expect ﬁrms to
lower their prices. The reduced VAT rate was widely enough announced
in the media around the time of the implementation of the reform. Thus
large number of consumers ought to have known about the experiment and
its likely eﬀect on prices. If consumers do not know about VAT reduc-
tion, it might be possible for ﬁrms not to lower prices if there is not much
competition between ﬁrms.
VAT is remitted to the Finnish tax authorities. Firms that are liable for
VAT have to report it once a month to their tax authority as a sum of taxes
remitted separately by tax rate. Thus in 2006 ﬁrms reported the amount
of taxes remitted at the 22 per cent rate and in 2007 they reported taxes
remitted at the 8 per cent rate on the same services. The chain feature of
crediting VAT paid on inputs is seen in the same monthly tax report. The
ﬁnal amount of taxes a ﬁrm ends up paying each month is the diﬀerence
between taxes charged on outputs and the taxes paid on inputs.
4.2.2 Predictions from economic theory
When a consumption tax is reduced, the standard economic model indi-
cates that the degree of tax shifting to prices depends on the elasticities of
demand and supply. If supply is much more elastic than demand, the re-
duced consumption tax should pass through to the consumer price (almost)
completely. In this model there would be no increase in (zero) proﬁts and
there would be constant returns to scale such that no ﬁrm is able to extract
any rents. These are restrictive assumptions that are not likely to hold in
empirical data.
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General equilibrium analysis takes into account the eﬀects on equilib-
rium quantities and thereby on factor demand. These will also depend on
the elasticities of other goods. These eﬀects were analysed in the Ramsey
(1927) model. In summary, if demand is inelastic and supply elastic, con-
sumption taxes pass through to prices in full. However because the level of
demand of a good that has inelastic demand will not change much, there
will not be major eﬀects on factor demand in the production of that good.
In the case of small labour-intensive ﬁrms, labour is the major input. Thus,
the greatest eﬀect of increasing input demand is on labour. This study esti-
mates empirically the extent to which demand for labour-intensive services
is aﬀected by reducing their value-added tax (VAT).
It is useful to consider the predictions of models with imperfect com-
petition that may ﬁt the empirical situation better. In an oligopoly model
with Cournot competition Delipalla and Keen (1992), and in a model with
Bertrand competition with diﬀerentiated products Anderson et al. (2001)
study the eﬀect of reducing ad valorem taxes on prices. Myles (1989) for-
mulated a Ramsey-type model where part of the economy was imperfectly
competitive. In these models the tax can over- or under-shift to the con-
sumer price. In contrast to a fully competitive model, it is possible that
the demand for a good is aﬀected, even if prices react to the tax change.
In shorter term the ﬁrms could increase their proﬁts if the economy is not
fully competitive. These proﬁts could lead to better employment situation
in the longer term if there was more entry or less entry to the aﬀected sec-
tor. Unfortunately the empirical analysis in this paper will be able to reveal
only short term eﬀects.
The aim of the above discussion is to remind the reader what economic
theory predicts would happen to the price of and demand for a good follow-
ing a tax decrease. It is easier to interpret the empirical results in the light
of theoretical mechanisms. In the literature there are plenty of theoretical
ﬁndings stating how consumption taxes should be set optimally. Hopefully
the empirical ﬁndings in this paper will be useful in this optimal tax litera-
ture. However I did not want to discuss optimal tax results here, since the
focus is on understanding what happened, not what should happen.
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4.2.3 What ought to happen?
In the VAT experiment for labour-intensive services the VAT was reduced
from 22% to 8%. In this case full pass-through would imply that prices
would be reduced by 11.5 per cent from the level before the experiment.
This can be seen from the formula below that shows how the percentage
change can be calculated when the producer price (φ) stays constant:
1.08 ∗ φ− 1.22 ∗ φ
1.22 ∗ φ ∗ 100 = −11.475% (4.1)
The turnover (Y ) evaluated at consumer price is deﬁned as the volume
or quantity (Q(p)) multiplied by the price (p): Y = Q ∗ p. Assuming no
change in demand and no change in consumer price, turnover would remain
the same. If nothing happens to demand, but prices are reduced, turnover
naturally declines. Reduced form regression on turnover reveals the eﬀect
reform has on this consumer price turnover.
To evaluate what would happen to demand for the products in the short
term if prices change, it would be ideal to know the quantity and price. In
this case turnover and price are observed, and using deﬁnition of turnover,
the eﬀect of price change on demand comes from following formula:
d(p ∗Q(p))
d(p)
= Q(p) + pQ′(p) = Q(p) (1 + η) (4.2)
where η is price elasticity of demand. Therefore the eﬀect on demand can
be seen by studying turnover and price changes simultaneously in the same
ﬁrm. In the empirical data there is the complication that the same ﬁrm
produces many services which prices may change diﬀerently from each other.
4.3 Econometric method
The econometric method used in this study is diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DD)
approach. The short-run eﬀects of taxes on prices and turnover are com-
pared between the treatment and control groups before and after the begin-
ning of 2007. The treatment group consists of hairdressers and the control
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group consists of beauty salons, day spas and masseurs. I estimate the
following equation for ﬁrm i and time t:
Yit = α+β11(haird)i+β21(after)t+β31(hairdi∗aftert)+β4Xit+εit (4.3)
where 1(haird) indicates a ﬁrm in the hairdresser group, 1(after) indicates
observations from the beginning of 2007 onwards. Yit is an outcome that
can be price, turnover or wage-sum depending on the speciﬁcation. X is a
vector of controls including ﬂexible time trends in some speciﬁcations as well
as other control variables describing the location and economic behaviour
of a ﬁrm.
The DD approach should identify β3, the eﬀect of a changing tax en-
vironment in the treatment group relative to the control group. This ap-
proach works well if the pre-treatment time trends between the two groups
are parallel to each other, indicating that the treatment group would have
behaved similarly to the control group in the absence of the reduced VAT
rate. Figure A2, which compares prices in the treatment and control groups,
indicates that this assumption seems to work well in this case. It would be
problematic if there were anticipation eﬀects before the reform. This could
happen if ﬁrms in the treatment group started to react prior to the re-
form, for example when the reduced VAT rate was announced but had not
yet taken eﬀect. Figure A2 again shows that prices do not show any such
anticipation eﬀects.
It is possible that there are other general equilibrium eﬀects that would
make the DD approach biased. These could include eﬀects on entry to
and exit from the treated industry. There could be eﬀects on competi-
tion between industries in the treatment and control groups. However, the
approach used identiﬁes short-term eﬀects. Looking at the eﬀects in the
monthly level data in particular it is diﬃcult to believe that the general
equilibrium eﬀects mentioned above could take place in few months. Also,
hairdressers are not substitutes for beauty salons, making competition be-
tween these two industries less intense.
In the second part of the analysis I am interested in how changes in
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prices can explain changes in turnover. The aim is to understand how price
aﬀects demand for the services. Mathematically this relationship is shown in
equation (4.2). Since the decision to reduce or not to reduce prices is made
by the ﬁrm, a simple regression between these two would be biased. Even
more fundamentally, turnover is deﬁned as price multiplied by quantity, and
quantity is a function of price. Thus changes in prices aﬀect turnover by
deﬁnition. To distinguish what eﬀect sudden price change has on quantity,
I use an instrumental variable (IV) strategy. Instrumental variable in this
case can be explained by running a regression how much the instrument,
change in VAT for the treatment group, aﬀects both prices and turnover:
pit = X
′π10 + π11Zit + ξ1it
Yit = X
′π20 + π21Zit + ξ2it
where, X is a vector of covariates, Z is the instrument variable and ξ
are the error terms. The instrumented eﬀect of price on turnover is given
by:
ρ =
π21
π11
The coeﬃcient ρ is the reduced form coeﬃcient (the eﬀect of VAT cut on
turnover) divided by the ﬁrst-stage coeﬃcient (the eﬀect of VAT cut on
prices). This measures similar eﬀect than equation (4.2), but uses only the
variation induced by the VAT-reform.
More speciﬁcally, I use a two-stage least squares (2SLS) strategy, where
the ﬁrst stage is equation (4.3) of prices. Then in the second stage I explain
the changes in turnover or wages by the ﬁrst stage. The variable that is
excluded is the interaction between the treatment and the after dummies.
The quantity in the short term should be only aﬀected through changes in
prices induced by the VAT reform. If the reform used in the DD approach
is exogenous to the economic circumstances of the targeted ﬁrms, using it
as an instrument should be valid.
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4.4 Data and description
The main part of the data utilised in this study comes from the Finnish Tax
Administration. Monthly data is available for the VAT remitted by each
tax rate, the VAT paid on inputs as well as total monthly salaries paid to
employees. The data covers the years from 2002 to 2008. In addition there
are yearly observations for ﬁnal turnover, various costs and proﬁts made.
The data obtained from the tax authority includes every ﬁrm that is liable
for remitting VAT in Finland in the selected sectors.
The price observations come from two separate sources. Both of the
data sets are survey data. One was conducted by Statistics Finland and
consists of the data used to calculate the oﬃcial Consumer Price Index. It
contains time series observations from 2002 to mid-2009. There are only
a few price variables, though. The other price data was collected by the
Finnish Consumer Agency. It contains only two time-observations, one
before and one after the reform. It contains the prices of every product of
about 400 hairdressers.
Figure A1 shows the development of the mean of various prices in the
treatment and control groups over time. The prices are shown in real terms
expressed in euros. The prices in the hairdressing services category (treat-
ment group) are haircut, hair dress, colour and highlights. The vertical line
shows the ﬁrst month of reduced VAT, January 2007. Based on the ﬁgure it
seems that there is a response in treatment group prices and none in control
group prices. With a long time series, it is possible to take into account
possible diﬀerences in the time trends of prices. Table A1 gives the overall
statistics of the same prices seen in ﬁgure A1.
The DD approach used in this paper requires the pre-treatment trends
to be similar in the treatment and control groups. To check this, ﬁgure A2
presents composite mean prices for both groups and the conﬁdence intervals
for them. The indices are calculated by adding together prices in the same
group and normalising the mean of that group to 100 at the end of 2006.
It is clear from the ﬁgure that the pre-treatment trends follow each other
fairly well and that the conﬁdence intervals overlap. Consequently, it seems
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that the treatment and control groups resemble each other well enough. In
January 2007, marked by the vertical line, the cut in VAT for the treatment
group takes place. The consequent drop in mean prices can be seen for
the treatment group, but not for the control group. The diﬀerence seems
tentatively signiﬁcant based on the conﬁdence intervals in the ﬁgure.
Table A2 presents descriptive statistics by ﬁrm type from the adminis-
trative data set. The table is divided by ﬁrm type and shows in each case
the mean, standard error and number of observations. The number of ob-
servations is large, because it is a monthly data set. Some of the variables
are on an annual level, though.
Two further ﬁgures describe the conditions in the data and check whether
it looks as if the assumptions required in the DD approach are met. Figure
A3 presents some of the key variables over time. The tax variable is the
one from which turnover is calculated. The drop in taxes remitted by the
treatment group in January 2007 highlights the loss in average tax revenues
when the reduced VAT was implemented. It is reassuring that there is no
drop in the control group at the same time. The variable labeled “input”
denotes VAT paid on all inputs by the ﬁrm. Since there is no increase in
this variable for hairdressers, there does not seem to be an increase in de-
mand for their products. If the volume of services sold by a ﬁrm increased
substantially, it would eventually need to buy more inputs to produce the
increased output.
Figure A4 presents the development of turnover evaluated at consumer
prices over time by ﬁrm type. This variable is interesting, since it is later
used as a dependent variable in the regressions. Turnover measured in this
way should stay constant if there is no change in the demand for or the
price of the products. After the VAT cut, marked by the vertical line, there
does not seem to be a marked eﬀect on turnover in the treatment group.
Although there could be some eﬀect, since the consumer prices themselves
indicate a drop, the eﬀect is so small that it is diﬃcult to see it from the
ﬁgure. It is clear that Sole proprietors fulﬁll the DD assumption of similar
pre-treatment trends better than other ﬁrm types. This fact is taken into
account in the regression analysis by dividing the results by ﬁrm type.
101
Chapter 4. Barbers’ VAT cut
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Tax incidence on prices
Table A3 presents the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences (DD) estimates for prices.
The dependent variable is a price that includes information from both sur-
veys and from the treatment and control groups. It is the same variable
which is described in ﬁgure A2. Column (1) contains all observations; in
columns (2) to (4) the data is split according to ﬁrm type: corporations,
sole proprietors and partnerships. The coeﬃcient in the ﬁrst row shows
the DD estimate. The results can be read directly as percentages. For all
ﬁrms, the eﬀect of reducing VAT by 14 percentage points is -7.2%. Thus,
compared to the theoretical full pass-through of -11.5%, the actual pass-
through is slightly over half. The Wald test indicates that this result is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from full pass-through. The heterogeneous response
by ﬁrm type is evident when comparing the estimates in columns (2) to (4).
Corporations respond the most, sole proprietors much less and the estimate
for partnerships is not even signiﬁcant. The result is most robust for sole
proprietors, since they account for the bulk of the data.
Tables A4 and A5 present the results for the probability of lowering
prices. The dependent variable is a dummy with a value of 1 if the price is
lowered by the cut-oﬀ value or more. In table A4 the cut-oﬀ value is 0.5%
and in table A5 5%. The columns present estimates for similar groups as
in table A3. The probability of lowering the price at least a little is on
average 0.55. This means that less than half of the ﬁrms in the treatment
group did not lower prices. Measured this way there is not much diﬀerence
in response by ﬁrm type. For ﬁrms that lowered prices by at least 5%, the
probability overall is only 0.35. There is a slight (statistically insigniﬁcant)
heterogeneity by ﬁrm type. Thus it seems that ﬁrms lowered prices by
diﬀerent amounts on average, but the proportion of ﬁrms that lowered prices
is more even between ﬁrm types.
There are two samples of prices in the data set used. To summarise
the changes in the data set obtained from the Consumer Agency, ﬁgure A5
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presents the mean change in each price in the data set. Since there are only
two points of time when prices are measured, and this data set does not
include the prices of control group products, the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences
approach can not be used here. Instead, I just present the mean change
and the conﬁdence interval of this for each price. It is interesting to note
that the average price change is only around -3%. Full pass-through of
the tax cut would have implied a price change of -11.475%. There is also
variation across products, so that it matters which hairdresser’s product
one is looking at when measuring the tax incidence on prices. The last two
prices, prices number 53 and 54, are the mean and sum of all the other
prices.
I estimated the probability of reducing a price by 1% or more and by
10% or more. The mean of those probabilities can be seen in ﬁgure A6.
Interestingly, more than half of the sample did not react to the tax change
at all, while only around 10% changed prices substantially. Again, there is
variation in the response probabilities between prices. The mean and sum
of other prices show that it is common for some of the prices to change a
little, but it is not very common for all of the prices to change substantially.
The prices that tended to be reduced are the prices of standard services like
“Basic haircutting, 30 minutes”.
The conclusion from all of the price results is that the overall pass-
through in this industry is about half and that it was relatively uncommon
for ﬁrms that did lower their prices to lower them by the amount of the
tax reduction. There is heterogeneity by ﬁrm type and by product type,
especially in the mean response.
4.5.2 Results for turnover
Table A6 shows the DD results for the turnover evaluated at consumer
prices. Column (1) shows the eﬀect for all ﬁrms without covariates other
than time. Column (2) adds ﬁrm-speciﬁc covariates such as taxes paid
on inputs and the area were the ﬁrm is located. Columns (3) to (5) again
present the divided-sample results by ﬁrm type for corporations, sole propri-
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etors and partnerships, respectively. The results indicate that the turnover
decreased modestly, which is consistent with the ﬁrms reducing consumer
price, but there is no oﬀsetting eﬀect from increasing demand.
The result is most reliable for sole proprietors in column (4), since the
DD assumptions are best met for them. The result indicates that turnover
decreased by about 100 euros as a result of the reduced VAT. Just prior
to implementing the reform, their mean turnover was about 3000 euros.
Thus the result indicates a decrease of 3.3% from that mean level. The full
response would have been -11.5%. This result could be explained by not
having full pass-through to consumer prices and also that some turnover
comes from other services for which VAT remained at the normal rate of
22%. None of the results are positive in a statistically signiﬁcant way. Con-
sequently, the results do not indicate that demand for the services increased.
To provide more evidence about the link between price and turnover
changes, I estimate the eﬀect price changes have on turnover. The mech-
anism that the IV-estimates aim at revealing is shown in equation (4.2).
The idea here is to use the VAT reform as an instrument that drives the
price changes and see what eﬀect that change has on turnover. To estimate
this, only the part of the data is used, where it was possible to link the
price and turnover information to the same ﬁrm. This reduces the number
of observations. The change in prices is instrumented with the diﬀerences-
in-diﬀerences variable as is explained in section 4.3. The interpretation of
the results is that if the second stage coeﬃcients are positive, the reduced
form and price change move in the same direction. If on the other hand
the increase in quantity is so large that the change in turnover induced by
the reform is positive even when the price decreases, the second stage coef-
ﬁcients are negative. Then there is a clear indication of increased demand
for the services.
Table A7 shows the IV results. The ﬁrst stage shows the eﬀect that the
DD variable has on prices. According to the F-test the ﬁrst stage is strong
enough in most cases. The price variable shows the eﬀect the instrumented
price has on consumer-price turnover in the second stage. The second stage
coeﬃcients are positive but statistically insigniﬁcant when the ﬁrst stage is
104
4.5. Results
signiﬁcant. This is somewhat ambiguous result, but at least it means that
the quantity did not increase signiﬁcantly due to reform. One reason for
ambiguous results is that the instrument variable comprises of one dummy
and some ﬁrms reduced their prices and some did not. This heterogeneous
response weakens the power of the instrument used. Also ﬁrms are very
heterogeneous and some larger ﬁrms have other activities that where not
aﬀected by the VAT cut, but show up in the turnover variable.
4.5.3 Results for other variables
Table A8 shows the results for other variables that might have been aﬀected
by the reduced VAT rate. These other variables come from tax declarations
and thus the variation in the variables is on an annual level. The interesting
outcomes in this data are proﬁts and net assets, since these can not be seen
from the month-level data.
The only signiﬁcant result in table A8 is the eﬀect on turnover. The
coeﬃcient follows the direction of the monthly-level data and is consis-
tent with the treatment group ﬁrms lowering their prices. It is interesting
that there does not seem to be a signiﬁcant increase in proﬁts or net as-
sets. It is possible that the proﬁts are not signiﬁcantly aﬀected even if the
entrepreneurs have beneﬁted from the lower VAT by not lowering the con-
sumer prices. The entrepreneurs might instead have increased their own
wages or expenditures in the ﬁrm accounts.
To investigate the potential link between the tax change and labour
demand, I estimated instrumental variables (IV) equation where the price
changes explain the changes in the monthly wage sums paid by a ﬁrm. The
method here is similar to that used to analyse the link between prices and
demand in table A7. The idea here is that in the short term those ﬁrms
that lower their prices will experience increase in the demand for their
services and thus need to hire more labour. The IV method here reveals
whether the VAT cut has any eﬀect on actual labour demand through the
channel explained above. If there is increase in wage sum, the reduced
form is positive and ﬁrst stage negative leading to negative coeﬃcient in
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the second stage.
Table A9 shows the results that do not display any signiﬁcant eﬀects on
the wage sum. The second stage is indeed negative, but again statistically
insigniﬁcant. Since there was no clear eﬀect on quantity, it is not surprising
that there is no clear eﬀect on the wage sum.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper studies the tax incidence of a reduced VAT rate on labour-
intensive services. As part of EU legislation, Finland selected some indus-
tries for a reduced VAT experiment of 8% while other similar industries
continued to be subject to the normal VAT rate of 22%. The experiment is
exogenous to the economic conditions of ﬁrms because the treatment group
was selected on the EU level and the control groups were left out quite
randomly.
The results indicate that taxes passed through to prices at a level of
around 50%. The results reveal some heterogeneity in tax incidence accord-
ing to ﬁrm type and product type. Corporations cut their prices more than
sole proprietors.
In the short run the eﬀects of lower VAT on turnover should follow
the price response if demand stays constant. If consumer prices do not
change and there is no change in demand, turnover stays constant. The
results indicate that on average turnover decreased as a result of the tax
reduction, but not by very much. There is heterogeneity across ﬁrm types,
but not always in the same direction as for the price responses. This can be
explained by the fact that corporations derive a large share of their turnover
from services on which VAT was not reduced.
To analyse whether demand increased for services on which VAT was
reduced, I estimated an instrumental variable model. There the change in
turnover is explained by the change in prices. Since any pricing decision
is made by the ﬁrm, there is possibly a selection problem if ﬁrms select
into lowering their prices because their demand was decreasing. Also, the
dependent variable is turnover that is a function of price by deﬁnition. To
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cope with these potential problems, the price change was instrumented.
The results did not show any statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect the change in
prices has on turnover. Thus it is concluded that there was no signiﬁcant
increase in demand for the services, at least in the short term. A similar
model was estimated for wages. The results do not show any eﬀect either.
This study showed that due to tax reduction there was only a partial
price response and no clear eﬀect on demand for the services, and no sig-
niﬁcant eﬀect on the labour demand. The Ramsey (1927) argument is that
taxes that induce small changes in equilibrium quantities should be higher.
According to this argument, therefore, the labour-intensive service sector
should be taxed more than some other sectors. At least we learned that
the reduced VAT rate was not particularly eﬀective in creating employment
through increased demand. Other justiﬁcations in theory for setting a tax
rate are that the good is complement with labour (Saez 2002) and that
there are equity reasons to do so (Diamond and Mirrlees 1971). According
to results in this study it seems that hairdressing services are not comple-
ment with the labour supply or that at least small price changes do not
induce higher demand that would reduce the time spent to hairdressing at
home. It can be argued that hairdressing is to some extent a luxury good,
making the equity reasons for lowering the VAT less compelling. Thus these
are not robust arguments in favour of reducing the VAT on these services.
Consumers beneﬁted from the lower taxes through prices that were lower
by half of what the reduced tax implied. The rest of the tax beneﬁted
the targeted ﬁrms, probably in form of higher proﬁts spread over diﬀerent
accounts in the data. The government lost about 4 million euros per month
in tax revenues from hairdressers. Thus it seems the reduced VAT regime
is not particularly eﬀective policy for labour-intensive services in terms of
lower prices and higher employment. In this case, reducing VAT appears to
have been a costly way of increasing employment.
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4.A Appendix
All the tables and ﬁgures are in this appendix.
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Figure A1: Comparison of development of prices in the control and treat-
ment groups over time
Note: The prices for Haircut, Hair dress, Colour and Highlights fall within the treatment
group and are prices of various services provided by hairdressers. The prices for Massage
and Facial fall within the control group.
stats Haircut Hair dress Highlights Colour Massage Facial
mean 24 32 63 56 23 51
sd 4.2 7.4 15 15 8.3 11
p50 23 30 62 53 21 50
max 48 58 115 115 67 95
min 11 15 29 23 10 20
N 12126 11806 2445 11811 4888 4889
Table A1: Statistics of price observations
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Figure A2: Prices in the control and treatment groups and their conﬁdence
intervals
Note: Comparison of the development of mean prices between the treatment and control
groups over time. The prices are composite prices for both groups that are normalised to
100 at the end of 2006. The conﬁdence intervals are calculated from the standard error
of the mean.
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Firm type Mean Sd N
Corporation Turnover 13527 24998 33095
Share treat 0.459 0.498 40481
Input tax 1820 14958 39903
Earnings 10660 55589 40481
Rents 80.5 2323 40481
Wages 2691 8529 40481
Sole prop Turnover 2651 2579 639294
Share treat 0.734 0.442 691925
Input tax 196 332 683116
Earnings 4198 37235 691925
Rents 16238 94896 691925
Wages 0.432 57.1 691925
Small corp Turnover 7137 9638 40249
Share treat 0.719 0.449 43516
Input tax 503 941 43122
Earnings 5694 16383 43516
Rents 3492 8789 43516
Wages 432 3177 43516
Table A2: Descriptive statistics for the dependent and control variables by
ﬁrm type
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Figure A3: Descriptive over time
VARS (1) (2) (3) (4)
All Corporation Sole proprietor Partnership
dd -7.6*** -10.42*** -6.21*** -3.89
(1.25) (3.52) (1.28) (3.16)
Constant 104.7*** 125.5*** 100.2*** 70.80***
(1.77) (5.51) (1.73) (14.36)
N 19244 4084 10385 2790
R2 0.14 0.14 0.2 0.28
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A3: Eﬀect of reducing VAT on mean prices
Note: The ﬁrst column contains all price observations, column (2) is for corporations,
column (3) for sole proprietors and column (4) for partnerships. The control variables
include: a dummy for each month, a separate linear time trend for the treatment group
and an indicator for each city in the sample.
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VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
All Corporation Sole proprietor Partnership
dd 0.55*** 0.62*** 0.53*** 0.57***
(0.009) (0.016) (0.012) (0.024)
treat -0.018*** -0.028** -0.012 -0.048***
(0.006) (0.012) (0.009) (0.018)
after 0.057** 0.11** 0.04 -0.00
(0.026) (0.048) (0.036) (0.065)
Constant -0.07*** 0.15*** -0.10*** -0.07
(0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.12)
Observations 16686 3646 9313 2511
R-squared 0.5 0.62 0.47 0.55
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A4: The eﬀect of lowering VAT on the probability of lowering prices
by at least 0.5%
Note: The ﬁrst column contains all price observations, column (2) is for corporations,
column (3) for sole proprietors and column (4) for partnerships. The control variables
include: a dummy for each month, a separate linear time trend for the treatment group
and an indicator for each city in the sample.
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VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
All Corporation Sole proprietor Partnership
dd 0.35*** 0.41*** 0.38*** 0.28***
(0.008) (0.018) (0.012) (0.021)
treat -0.02** -0.04*** -0.01* -0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
after 0.043* 0.11** 0.02 -0.02
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06)
Constant -0.06*** 0.27*** -0.12*** -0.12
(0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.11)
N 16686 3646 9313 2511
R2 0.33 0.44 0.35 0.37
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A5: The eﬀect of reducing VAT on the probability of lowering prices
by at least 5%
Note: The ﬁrst column contains all price observations, column (2) is for corporations,
column (3) for sole proprietors and column (4) for partnerships. The control variables
include: a dummy for each month, a separate linear time trend for the treatment group
and an indicator for each city in the sample.
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Figure A5: Mean change in prices
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VARS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All All Corporation Sole proprietor Partnership
dd -432.4** -151.4** 546.7 -102.3*** -235.1
(201.7) (61.7) (845.4) (22.0) (224.8)
treat -2,599.9*** -420.8*** -2,657.7*** 332.1*** 581.7***
(195.6) (59.9) (784) (21.8) (208.1)
after 1,228.5*** -165.3 -2,469.7* 46.2 535.9
(343.4) (105.0) (1,481.4) (37.1) (394.4)
Constant 5,95*** 2,47*** 7,68*** 1,68*** 1,69***
(243) (84) (1,163) (29) (335)
N 946216 946216 53941 822919 63155
R2 0.00 0.91 0.92 0.47 0.68
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A6: The eﬀect of reducing VAT on turnover
Note: The dependent variable, consumer price turnover, is in nominal terms. Columns
(1) and (2) are for all ﬁrms, column (3) for corporations, column (4) for sole proprietors
and column (5) for partnerships. The control variables include: ﬂexible time controls,
use of inputs, amount of salaries paid and use of rents.
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VARS (1) (2) (3) (4)
All Corporation Sole Proprietor Partnership
First stage -6.80*** -10.38*** -7.2*** -3.11
(1.42) (3.5) (1.51) (5.07)
F-test 22.83 8.80 22.66 0.38
Price 196.9 625.4 14.91 -449.2
(2nd stage) (408.5) (1358) (80.51) (1813)
Inputs 6.945*** 6.912*** 12.13*** 10.07***
(0.0217) (0.0626) (0.612) (2.824)
Constant 1573 -35765 -2049 49012
(43075) (117104) (7113) (173088)
N 11893 2039 7875 1979
R2 0.953 0.953 0.611 0.560
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A7: Turnover according to price reaction
Note: The dependent variable is consumer-price turnover. The price variable is instru-
mented in the ﬁrst stage by the DD variable. The F-test is a test of strength of the ﬁrst
stage. Column (1) contains all ﬁrms that had price and turnover information linked in the
data, column (2) corporations, column (3) sole proprietors and column (4) partnerships.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARS Turnover Proﬁt Net assets Wages Employees
dd -1,727*** 1,729 -2,633 1,248 0.17
(505) (3,319) (9,414) (2,679) (0.234)
N 50752 49537 48299 4472 4904
R2 0.903 0.001 0.000 0.375 0.222
N of ﬁrms 13944 13662 13649 2116 2262
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A8: Fixed-eﬀects regression results for other outcomes in the annual
data
Note: The dependent variables are consumer price turnover, proﬁts, net assets, annual
wages and number of employees in one year. All regressions are ﬁxed-eﬀects regressions
controlled for time and input use of the ﬁrm.
119
Chapter 4. Barbers’ VAT cut
VARS (1) (2) (3) (4)
All Corporation Sole proprietor Partnership
First stage -6.61*** -5.91 -7.46*** -4.91
(1.66) (4.24) (1.76) 6.04
F-test 15.89 1.93 18.03 0.66
Price -2687 -18025 1684 -11084
(2nd stage) (21341) (114644) (3692) (38620)
Inputs 36.43*** 36.20*** 245.1*** 97.11
(0.944) (2.506) (26.74) (74.05)
Constant 365029 1.378e+06 -239845 899632
(2.224e+06) (1.107e+07) (323947) (3.891e+06)
N 10146 1744 6743 1659
R2 0.272 0.351 0.313 0.199
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A9: Wages according to price reaction
Note: The dependent variable is monthly wages. The price variable is instrumented in
the ﬁrst stage by the DD variable. The F-test is a test of strength of the ﬁrst stage.
Column (1) contains all ﬁrms that had price and turnover information linked in the data,
column (2) corporations, column (3) sole proprietors and column (4) partnerships.
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